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ESTABLISHING AN UNQUALIFIED
STANDARD FOR REMOVAL UNDER 28 U.S.C.
§ 1441: THE PROPRIETY OF REMOVING
MARITIME CASES TO FEDERAL COURT
Michael Schwartz, J.D., Ph.D.*
The ability to remove a case from state court to federal court is a
staple of our judicial system. In order for a case to be removable, it must
fall within the purview of the federal courts’ original jurisdiction. While
federal jurisdiction encompasses admiralty and maritime matters, these
cases were long-held to be non-removable under 28 U.S.C. § 1441: the
removal statute. However, the removal statute was amended in 2011 and
no longer arguably excludes maritime cases from removal jurisdiction.
Several courts consequently permitted removal of maritime cases, but
this practice was widely condemned and proved to be short-lived as the
judiciary utilized other bases to uphold the longstanding prohibition. Yet,
cases from both the Fifth and Seventh Circuits have renewed the uncertainty as to whether maritime cases are in fact removable and have provided an opportunity to finally eliminate the confusion surrounding the
topic. This Article elucidates the errancy in both the historical and more
recent justifications for denying removal of maritime cases and harmonizes the objectives of the implicated statutes within the modern judiciary. In the current absence of a credible prohibition, federal courts are
poised to allow maritime removal while also comporting with the various
bases previously used to justify the exclusion of maritime cases from removal jurisdiction.

* Associate with BakerHostetler; Cornell University, B.S.; The University of Chicago,
Ph.D.; Villanova University, J.D. I would like to thank Elizabeth Robbins, Brett Frischmann, and
Tuan Samahon for their helpful comments and suggestions.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Original jurisdiction: a simple standard to remove a case from
state court to federal court.1 Among civil procedure concepts, this one
is rather elementary. Plainly, if a case could have been originally filed
in federal court, it will be removable there.2 Perhaps the most noteworthy bases for federal jurisdiction are federal question,3 diversity of
citizenship,4 and admiralty/maritime,5 which appear sequentially in
the United States Code. These main types of cases, among others,6
should therefore be removable to federal court. It seems straightforward enough.
Except maritime cases are not removable. Despite being within
the original jurisdiction of the federal courts,7 and not exempted from
removability,8 general maritime cases have long been held to be nonremovable without an independent basis for federal jurisdiction.9
Given the importance of removal as a procedural tool,10 lawyers are
frequently surprised to learn of such a flagrant inconsistency in the
1. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (2018) (“[A]ny civil action brought in a State court of which the district courts of the United States have original jurisdiction, may be removed . . . .”).
2. Sabin v. Home Owners’ Loan Corp., 147 F.2d 653, 655–56 (10th Cir. 1945) (“The test for
determining the removability of an action is whether the United States Court might have exercised
original jurisdiction.”); Nyberg v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 123 F. Supp. 599, 602–03 (W.D.
Mich. 1954) (“The test as to whether the defendant was entitled to remove the present civil action
from the State court to this Federal district court, is whether this court would have had original
jurisdiction of the action.”).
3. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (“The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions
arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.”).
4. Id. § 1332(a) (“The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions where
the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and
is between—(1) citizens of different States . . . .”).
5. Id. § 1333 (“The district courts shall have original jurisdiction, exclusive of the courts of
the States, of: (1) Any civil case of admiralty or maritime jurisdiction . . . .”).
6. See id. §§ 1330–1369.
7. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 (“The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases . . . of admiralty
and maritime Jurisdiction . . . .”); 28 U.S.C. § 1333 (“The district courts shall have original jurisdiction, exclusive of the courts of the States, of: (1) Any civil case of admiralty or maritime jurisdiction . . . .”).
8. See 28 U.S.C. § 1445.
9. See, e.g., Demer v. Pac. S.S. Co., 273 F. 567, 569 (W.D. Wash. 1921) (denying removal
of a maritime claim); see also In re Chimenti, 79 F.3d 534, 537 (6th Cir. 1996) (citations omitted)
(“[T]he two courts of appeals that have squarely faced the issue have held that admiralty and maritime claims are not removable to federal court unless there exists some independent basis, such as
diversity of the parties, for federal jurisdiction.”).
10. See Thomas R. Hrdlick, Appellate Review of Remand Orders in Removed Cases: Are They
Losing a Certain Appeal?, 82 MARQ. L. REV. 535, 535 (1999) (“The removal of lawsuits from state
to federal courts is a litigation privilege and tactic as old as the Federal Constitution and the Federal
Judiciary it contemplated.”).
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removal standard.11 This obscure procedural convention has been
based largely on a strained interpretation of 28 U.S.C. § 1441—the
removal statute—which was deemed to prohibit removing maritime
cases to federal court.12 Until recently, this practice was sparsely challenged.13
Everything changed in 2011 when the Federal Courts Jurisdiction
and Venue Clarification Act (JVCA)14 eliminated the language in 28
U.S.C. § 1441 that arguably restricted removal of maritime cases.15
Following the JVCA, several district courts acted in accordance with
the plain meaning of the amended statute and permitted removal of
maritime cases under admiralty jurisdiction.16 However, most district
11. See Michael A. Orlando, To Remove or Not to Remove, That Is the Question, INT’L RISK
MGMT. INST. (Feb. 2002), https://www.irmi.com/articles/expert-commentary/to-remove-or-not-toremove-that-is-the-question [https://perma.cc/V8JL-5RRZ].
12. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b) (2006) (amended 2011) (“Any other such action shall be removable only if none of the parties in interest properly joined and served as defendants is a citizen of
the State in which such action is brought.”). Maritime cases were considered “other actions” under
28 U.S.C. § 1441(b). In re Dutile, 935 F.2d 61, 63 (5th Cir. 1991) (“[A]dmiralty and general maritime claims fall within the category of ‘[a]ny other [civil] action’ governed by the second sentence
of § 1441(b).” (second and third alterations in original)). This inclusion was deemed to be a prohibition on removing maritime cases. Id. (“The practical effect of [§ 1441(b)] is to prevent the removal of admiralty claims pursuant to § 1441(a) unless there is complete diversity of citizenship . . . .”).
13. In the mid-1950s several courts found that maritime cases could be removed as “other
actions” under the contemporaneous 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b) as long as no defendants were citizens of
the forum state. See, e.g., Davis v. Matson Navigation Co., 143 F. Supp. 537, 538–39 (N.D. Cal.
1956); Crispin Co. v. Lykes Bros. S.S. Co., 134 F. Supp. 704, 707 (S.D. Tex. 1955); Crawford v.
E. Asiatic Co., 156 F. Supp. 571, 573 (N.D. Cal. 1957).
14. See The Federal Courts Jurisdiction and Venue Clarification Act of 2011, Pub. L. 112-63,
125 Stat. 758.
15. Compare 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b) (2006) (amended 2011) (“Any civil action of which the
district courts have original jurisdiction founded on a claim or right arising under the Constitution,
treaties or laws of the United States shall be removable without regard to the citizenship or residence of the parties. Any other such action shall be removable only if none of the parties in interest
properly joined and served as defendants is a citizen of the State in which such action is brought.”),
with 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b)(2) (2018) (“A civil action otherwise removable solely on the basis of the
jurisdiction under section 1332(a) of this title may not be removed if any of the parties in interest
properly joined and served as defendants is a citizen of the State in which such action is brought.”).
16. See Ryan v. Hercules Offshore, Inc., 945 F. Supp. 2d 722, 779 (S.D. Tex. 2013); Wells v.
Abe’s Boat Rentals Inc., No. H-13-1112, 2013 WL 3110322, at *4 (S.D. Tex. June 18, 2013); Carrigan v. M/V AMC Ambassador, No. H-13-03208, 2014 WL 358353, at *2 (S.D. Tex. Jan. 31,
2014); Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Starr Indem. & Liab. Co., No. H-14-1147, 2014 WL 2739309, at *2
(S.D. Tex. June 17, 2014), rev’d on other grounds, 2014 WL 4167807 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 20, 2014);
Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Starr Indem. & Liab. Ins. Co., 181 F. Supp. 3d 347, 357 (S.D. Tex. 2015);
Murphy v. Seadrill Ams., Inc., No. H-4-1454, 2014 WL 12642104, at *4 (S.D. Tex. Nov. 14, 2014);
Costanza v. Accutrans, Inc., No. 17-5706, 2017 WL 4785004, at *5 (E.D. La. Oct. 24, 2017);
Bridges v. Phillips 66 Co., No. 13-477, 2013 WL 6092803, at *4 (M.D. La. Nov. 19, 2013); Harrold
v. Liberty Ins. Underwriters, Inc., No. 13-762, 2014 WL 688984, at *4 (M.D. La. Feb. 20, 2014);
Garza v. Phillips 66 Co., No. 13-742, 2014 WL 1330547, at *5 (M.D. La. Apr. 1, 2014); Provost
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courts rejected a four-corners reading of the revised removal statute
and held that the JVCA did not affect the longstanding practice of excluding maritime cases from removal jurisdiction.17
v. Offshore Serv. Vessels, LLC, No. 14-89, 2014 WL 2515412, at *3 (M.D. La. June 4, 2014);
Walker v. BP Prods. N. Am., Inc., No. 1-13-CV-257, 2013 WL 11332950, at *3 (E.D. Tex.
Sept. 16, 2013).
17. See Pierce v. Parker Towing Co., 25 F. Supp. 3d 1372, 1380 (S.D. Ala. 2014); Dirkse v.
Nu Venture Diving Co., No. LA CV17-08554 JAK (MRWx), 2018 WL 6133683, at *6 (C.D. Cal.
May 21, 2018); J.P. v. Connell, 93 F. Supp. 3d 1298, 1303 (M.D. Fla. 2015); Kirkland v. Edward
Yarborough Ranches, Inc., No. 15-cv-1436-Orl-40GJK, 2016 WL 8943288, at *4–5 (M.D. Fla.
Apr. 14, 2016); Int’l Marine Underwriters v. S. Drydock, Inc., No. 16-cv-220-J-39, 2016 WL
11431679, at *4 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 17, 2016); Mitev v. Resort Sports Ltd., 133 F. Supp. 3d 1365,
1371 (S.D. Fla. 2015); Boakye v. NCL (Bah.) Ltd., 295 F. Supp. 3d 1342, 1348 (N.D. Ga. 2018);
Palmer v. Georgia Ports Auth., No. CV 416-199, 2016 WL 5030372, at *4 (S.D. Ga. Sept. 19,
2016); Barglowski v. Nealco Int’l LLC, No. 16-00209, 2016 WL 5107043, at *8 (D. Haw. Sept. 20,
2016); Lewis v. Foster, No. 18-60-DLB-CJS, 2018 WL 4224445, at *5 (E.D. Ky. Sept. 5, 2018);
In re Foss Mar. Co., 29 F. Supp. 3d 955, 961 (W.D. Ky. 2014); Brown v. Porter, 149 F. Supp. 3d
963, 973 (N.D. Ill. 2016); Barry v. Shell Oil Co., No. 13-6133, 2014 WL 775662, at *3 (E.D. La.
Feb. 25, 2014); Perrier v. Shell Oil Co., No. 14-490, 2014 WL 2155258, at *3 (E.D. La. May 22,
2014); Grasshopper Oysters, Inc. v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock, LLC, No. 14-934, 2014 WL
3796150, at *2 (E.D. La. July 29, 2014); Gregoire v. Enter. Marine Servs., LLC, 38 F. Supp. 3d
749, 765 (E.D. La. 2014); Henry J. Ellender Heirs, LLC v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 42 F. Supp. 3d 812,
819 (E.D. La. 2014); Riley v. Llog Expl. Co., No. 14-437, 2014 WL 4345002, at *5 (E.D. La.
Aug. 28, 2014); Bisso Marine Co. v. Techcrane Int’l, LLC, No. 14-0375, 2014 WL 4489618, at *5
(E.D. La. Sept. 10, 2014); Yavorsky v. Felice Navigation, Inc., No. 14-2007, 2014 WL 5816999,
at *5 (E.D. La. Nov. 7, 2014); Parish of Plaquemines v. Total Petrochemical & Refin. USA, Inc.,
64 F. Supp. 3d 872, 899–900 (E.D. La. 2014); Plaquemines Parish v. Rozel Operating Co., No. 136722, 2015 WL 403791, at *4 (E.D. La. Jan. 29, 2015); Jefferson Parish v. Anadarko E&P Onshore
LLC, No. 13-6701, 2015 WL 13534014, at *6 (E.D. La. Mar. 11, 2015); Alexander v. Magnolia
Marine Transp. Co., No. 14-2795, 2015 WL 1298394, at *3 (E.D. La. Mar. 19, 2015); Jefferson
Parish v. Equitable Petrol. Corp., No. 13-6714, 2015 WL 2372362, at *11 (E.D. La. May 18, 2015);
Defelice Land Co. v. ConocoPhillips Co., No. 15-614, 2015 WL 3773034, at *5 (E.D. La. June 17,
2015); Jefferson Parish v. Exxon Mobile Corp., No. 13-6717, 2015 WL 4097111, at *19 (E.D. La.
July 7, 2015); Plaquemines Parish v. BEPCO, L.P., No. 13-6704, 2015 WL 4097062, at *18 (E.D.
La. July 7, 2015); Darville v. Tidewater Marine Serv., Inc., No. 15-6441, 2016 WL 1402837, at *8
(E.D. La. Apr. 11, 2016); Arrington v. Seaonus Stevedoring—New Orleans, LLC, No. 17-9383,
2017 WL 4803933, at *2 (E.D. La. Oct. 25, 2017); Fleming v. New Orleans Cold Storage & Warehouse Co., No. 18-4567, 2018 WL 2980067, at *4 (E.D. La. June 14, 2018); Langlois v. Kirby
Inland Marine, LP, 139 F. Supp. 3d 804, 815 (M.D. La. 2015); Bingham v. Haynes, No. 17-1694,
2018 WL 2124898, at *5 (M.D. La. Feb. 28, 2018); Jackson v. Chem Carriers LLC, No. 18-1052,
2019 WL 1906261, at *3 (M.D. La. Apr. 3, 2019); Gabriles v. Chevron USA, Inc., No. 14-00669,
2014 WL 2567101, at *4 (W.D. La. June 6, 2014); Harbor Docking & Towing Co. v. Rolls Royce
Marine N. Am., No. 14-CV-2487, 2014 WL 6608354, at *3 (W.D. La. Nov. 19, 2014); Serigny v.
Chevron U.S.A., Inc., No. 14-0598, 2014 WL 6982213, at *4 (W.D. La. Dec. 9, 2014); Boudreaux
v. Glob. Offshore Res., LLC, No. 14-2507, 2015 WL 419002, at *7 (W.D. La. Jan. 30, 2015); Smith
v. Marquette Transp. Co., No. 16-CV-01545, 2017 WL 3648459, at *3 (W.D. La. Aug. 1, 2017);
Parish of Cameron v. Auster Oil & Gas, Inc., No. 16-cv-530, 2018 WL 2164854, at *4 (W.D. La.
Jan. 17, 2018); Averill v. Fiandaca, No. 17-cv-00287, 2017 WL 4419242, at *2 (D. Me. Oct. 5,
2017); Cassidy v. Murray, 34 F. Supp. 3d 579, 584 (D. Md. 2014); Schaffer v. Air & Liquid Sys.
Corp., No. 14CV1789, 2015 WL 1611352, at *3 (E.D. Mo. Apr. 10, 2015); Glazer v. Honeywell
Int’l, Inc., No. 16-7714, 2017 WL 1943953, at *6 (D.N.J. May 10, 2017); Nassau Cnty. Bridge
Auth. v. Olsen, 130 F. Supp. 3d 753, 763 (E.D.N.Y. 2015); Gonzalez v. Red Hook Container
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Terminal, LLC, No. 16-CV-5104, 2016 WL 7322335, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 15, 2016); In re Nagler,
246 F. Supp. 3d 648, 664–65 (E.D.N.Y. 2017); Forde v. Hornblower N.Y., LLC, 243 F. Supp. 3d
461, 469–70 (S.D.N.Y. 2017); Atl. Coast Marine Grp. v. Willis, 210 F. Supp. 3d 807, 811 (E.D.N.C.
2016); Sullivan v. Bay Point Resort Operations LLC, 433 F. Supp. 3d 1072, 1076 (N.D. Ohio
2019); Iturrino Carrillo v. Marina Puerto del Rey Operations, LLC, 432 F. Supp. 3d 7, 12 (D.P.R.
2019); Progressive Mountain Ins. Co. v. Dana C. McLendon Co., No. 14-cv-04413, 2015 WL
925932, at *3 (D.S.C. Mar. 4, 2015); Hamerly v. Tubal-Cain Marine Servs., Inc., 62 F. Supp. 3d
555, 560 (E.D. Tex. 2014); Dyche v. U.S. Env’t Servs., Inc., 72 F. Supp. 3d 692, 698 (E.D. Tex.
2014); Skarpa v. Cameron Int’l Corp., No. 13-cv-616, 2015 WL 11072129, at *6 (E.D. Tex. Jan. 30,
2015); Carnes v. Friede & Goldman, LLC, 103 F. Supp. 3d 821, 826 (E.D. Tex. 2015); Hilton v.
Kirby Inland Marine, LP, No. 15-CV-93, 2016 WL 9088756, at *4 (E.D. Tex. Feb. 24, 2016);
Palmer v. Beach Dryden Scuba Enters. LLC, No. 17-CV-1819-L, 2018 WL 1569890, at *6 (N.D.
Tex. Mar. 30, 2018); Rogers v. BBC Chartering Am., LLC, No. 13-CV-3741, 2014 WL 819400, at
*1 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 3, 2014); Alexander v. Seago Consulting, LLC, No. 14-CV-1292, 2014 WL
2960419, at *1 (S.D. Tex. June 23, 2014); Figueroa v. Marine Inspection Servs., 28 F. Supp. 3d
677, 682 (S.D. Tex. 2014); Rutherford v. Breathwite Marine Contractors, Ltd., 59 F. Supp. 3d 809,
813 (S.D. Tex. 2014); Parker v. U.S. Env’t Servs., LLC, No. 14-CV-292, 2014 WL 7338850, at *6
(S.D. Tex. Dec. 22, 2014); Key Energy Servs., Inc. v. Matt-Alex, Inc., No. H-13-2853, 2015 WL
13800090, at *4 (S.D. Tex. Jan. 8, 2015); Cormier v. Chet Morrison Contractors, LLC, 85 F. Supp.
3d 880, 884 (S.D. Tex. 2015); Mims v. Deepwater Corrosion Servs., Inc., 90 F. Supp. 3d 679, 702–
03 (S.D. Tex. 2015); Waddell v. Edison Chouest Offshore, 93 F. Supp. 3d 714, 725 (S.D. Tex.
2015); Clear Lake Marine Ctr., Inc. v. Leidolf, No. H-14-3567, 2015 WL 1876338, at *2 (S.D. Tex.
Apr. 22, 2015); Ruiz v. Tube-Mac Indus. (Servs.), Inc., No. B-15-017, 2015 WL 12838998, at *6
(S.D. Tex. May 1, 2015); Ritchey v. Kirby Corp., No. CIV.A. 14-CV-0272, 2015 WL 4657548, at
*4 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 5, 2015); Jimenez v. US Env’t Servs., LLC, No. 14-CV-0246, 2015 WL
4692850, at *4 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 6, 2015); Quintanilla v. Peveto Cos., No. 15-CV-288, 2015 WL
12838865, at *4 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 27, 2015); Sanders v. Cambrian Consultants (CC) Am., Inc., 132
F. Supp. 3d 853, 858 (S.D. Tex. 2015); Harrison v. Crowley Mar. Corp., 181 F. Supp. 3d 441, 444
(S.D. Tex. 2016); Pelagidis v. Future Care, Inc., No. H-17-3798, 2018 WL 2221838, at *8 (S.D.
Tex. May 15, 2018); A.E.A. ex rel. Angelopoulos v. Volvo Penta of the Ams., LLC, 77 F. Supp.
3d 481, 492 (E.D. Va. 2015); Coronel v. AK Victory, 1 F. Supp. 3d 1175, 1189 (W.D. Wash. 2014);
N.Y. Marine & Gen. Ins. Co. v. AGCS Marine Ins. Co., 454 F. Supp. 3d 1335, 1346 (S.D. Ga.
2020); Harper v. Wetnwild Water Sports, LLC, No. 19cv4919, 2020 WL 773445, at *2 (N.D. Fla.
Jan. 13, 2020); Great N. & S. Navigation Co. LLC French Am. Line v. Certain Underwriters at
Lloyd’s, London, No. 18-4665, 2019 WL 5957583, at *2 (E.D. La. Nov. 13, 2019); Jackson v. Am.
Bureau of Shipping, No. H-20-109, 2020 WL 1743541, at *2 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 8, 2020); Belanger
v. McDermott Int’l, Inc., No. H-19-1591, 2019 WL 5595452, at *2 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 30, 2019); Est.
of Umar v. Bensch, No. 18-CV-01414, 2020 WL 3491633, at *2 (W.D.N.Y. Jan. 9, 2020), report
and recommendation adopted, No. 18-CV-1414, 2020 WL 3489674 (W.D.N.Y. June 26, 2020),
aff’d in part, rev’d in part and remanded, 2 F.4th 70 (2d Cir. 2021); Williams v. Aquachile, Inc.,
470 F. Supp. 3d 1277, 1279–80 (S.D. Fla. 2020); Granite State Ins. Co. v. Chaucer Syndicate 1084
at Lloyd’s, No. H-20-1588, 2020 WL 8678020, at *5 (S.D. Tex. July 14, 2020); Se. Dock & Platform, LLC v. Atl. Specialty Ins. Co., No. 20-1204, 2020 WL 5105322, at *2–3 (D.S.C. Aug. 31,
2020); Trahan v. Teche Towing Inc., No. 20-CV-01004, 2020 WL 6143664, at *4 (W.D. La. Oct. 1,
2020), report and recommendation adopted, No. 20-CV-01004, 2020 WL 6143691 (W.D. La.
Oct. 19, 2020); Rivera v. Orion Marine Grp. Inc., 509 F. Supp. 3d 926, 933–34 (S.D. Tex. 2020),
appeal filed, sub nom. Rivera v. Epic Midstream, No. 21-40005 (5th Cir. Jan. 4, 2021); Silagyi v.
Towriss, No. 20-61850-CIV, 2020 WL 7348095, at *1 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 11, 2020); Island Ventures,
LLC v. K-Mar Supply II, LLC, No. 20-2263, 2020 WL 6269136, at *7 (E.D. La. Oct. 26, 2020);
Allied Shipyard Inc. v. Moore, No. 20-2744, 2020 WL 7351306, at *2 (E.D. La. Dec. 15, 2020);
Est. of Saravia v. Bayonne Dry Dock & Repair Corp., 492 F. Supp. 3d 345, 353–54 (D.N.J. 2020),
appeal filed, No. 20-3334 (3d Cir. Nov. 19, 2020); Alexis v. Hilcorp Energy Co., 493 F. Supp. 3d
497, 506 (E.D. La. 2020); Cantu v. Orion Marine Grp., LLC, 510 F. Supp. 3d 453, 458 (S.D. Tex.
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In the absence of a plausible restriction within 28 U.S.C. § 1441
after the JVCA, a bar to removing maritime cases had to be justified
elsewhere. Consequently, courts employed a clause within the admiralty jurisdiction statute, which was written to protect a maritime
plaintiff’s right to a jury trial in non-admiralty courts: the so-called
saving-to-suitors clause.18 Why did the right to a jury trial require express protection? As it happens, maritime claims originally brought in
federal court—or theoretically removed to federal court—proceed under admiralty jurisdiction, which does not afford the right to a jury trial
unless one is provided via a statute19 or an independent basis for jurisdiction.20 When the newly minted federal judiciary was granted “exclusive original cognizance of all civil causes of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction,”21 the possibility emerged that federal admiralty
jurisdiction—and its corresponding absence of a jury22—was compulsory for adjudication of maritime claims. Because this was not the
case, the saving-to-suitors clause23 explicitly protected both the power

2020), appeal docketed, sub nom. Cantu v. Epic Midstream Holdings, No. 21-40011 (5th Cir.
Jan. 5, 2021); Cook v. Rowan Cos., No. H-20-3811, 2021 WL 918756, at *4 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 10,
2021); Curry v. Boeing Co., No. 20 C 3088, 2021 WL 1088325, at *11 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 22, 2021);
Ibarra v. Port of Houston Auth., 526 F. Supp. 3d 202, 215–16 (S.D. Tex. 2021); Margaritis v. Mayo,
No. 20-CV-3995, 2021 WL 3472695, at *2–5 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 6, 2021).
18. 28 U.S.C. § 1333 (2018) (“The district courts shall have original jurisdiction, exclusive of
the courts of the States, of: (1) Any civil case of admiralty or maritime jurisdiction, saving to suitors
in all cases all other remedies to which they are otherwise entitled.” (emphasis added)).
19. See FED. R. CIV. P. 9 advisory committee’s note to 1966 amendment (“One of the important procedural consequences is that in the civil action either party may demand a jury trial,
while in the suit in admiralty there is no right to jury trial except as provided by statute.”); see also
Fitzgerald v. U.S. Lines Co., 374 U.S. 16, 17 (1963) (“[T]he actions for unseaworthiness and for
maintenance and cure are traditional admiralty remedies which in the absence of a statute do not
ordinarily require trial by jury.”).
20. See In re Chimenti, 79 F.3d 534, 537 (6th Cir. 1996) (“[A]dmiralty and maritime claims
are not removable to federal court unless there exists some independent basis, such as diversity of
the parties, for federal jurisdiction.”).
21. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 9, 1 Stat. 73, 76–77 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 28 U.S.C.) (emphasis added) (“That the district courts[] shall have . . . exclusive original
cognizance of all civil causes of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction . . . .”).
22. See id. at 77 (“And the trial of issues in fact, in the district courts, in all causes except civil
causes of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, shall be by jury.”).
23. The original saving-to-suitors clause provided that, “[T]he district courts[] shall have . . .
exclusive original cognizance of all civil causes of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction . . . saving
to suitors, in all cases, the right of a common law remedy, where the common law is competent to
give it . . . .” Id. at 76–77. This enactment is currently codified in 28 U.S.C. § 1333.
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of state courts to adjudicate maritime matters within their borders24
and a plaintiff’s corresponding right to a jury trial in state court.25
Preventing removal with a statute that protects jury trials is
founded on the rationale that a defendant’s act of removing a case under admiralty jurisdiction would deprive a maritime plaintiff of the
right to a jury trial.26 This historic right existed prior to the creation of
the federal judiciary27 and was explicitly protected by the saving-tosuitors clause thereafter.28 However, the protection provided by the
saving-to-suitors clause only extends to the jury trial and not to the
state forum itself.29 The saving-to-suitors clause could therefore only
operate to bar removal if federal courts sitting in admiralty necessarily
deprive plaintiffs of jury trials, which is not the case.30
Following the stint of decisions that permitted maritime cases to
be removed after the JVCA,31 district courts decisively settled on prohibiting the practice.32 However, the higher courts that have considered the issue following the JVCA have not followed course. Cases
from both the Fifth and Seventh Circuits have surprisingly maintained
24. See Steamboat Co. v. Chase, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 522, 527 (1872) (“The fact that the Federal
government has the power to carry out the objects of the Federal government over water or land,
does not abrogate the power of a State to protect her citizens.”).
25. See Red Cross Line v. Atl. Fruit Co., 264 U.S. 109, 123–24 (1924) (“The ‘right of a common-law remedy,’ so saved to suitors . . . include[s] . . . all means other than proceedings in admiralty which may be employed to enforce the right or to redress the injury involved.”); see also
Lewis v. Lewis & Clark Marine, Inc., 531 U.S. 438, 454–55 (2001) (“Trial by jury is an obvious,
but not exclusive, example of the remedies available to suitors.” (citations omitted)).
26. See, e.g., Barry v. Shell Oil Co., No. 13-6133, 2014 WL 775662, at *3 (E.D. La. Feb. 25,
2014) (“[T]he removal of Plaintiff’s claim solely on the basis of admiralty jurisdiction would deprive him of the right to pursue his nonmaritime remedy of a jury trial . . . .”); Riley v. Llog Expl.
Co., No. 14-437, 2014 WL 4345002, at *4 (E.D. La. Aug. 28, 2014) (“[T]here can be no question
that a plaintiff necessarily loses his right to a jury trial when a case is removed into admiralty.”).
27. See Robert Force, Understanding the Nonremovability of Maritime Cases: Lessons
Learned from “Original Intent,” 89 TUL. L. REV. 1019, 1022–23 (2015) (“The vice-admiralty
courts heard cases without a jury, and plaintiffs could choose to file suit there or in the common
law courts.”).
28. See Lewis, 531 U.S. at 454–55 (“Trial by jury is an obvious, but not exclusive, example of
the remedies available to suitors.”).
29. See The Moses Taylor, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 411, 431 (1866) (“It is not a remedy in the common-law courts which is saved, but a common-law remedy.”); The Belfast, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 624,
644 (1868) (common law remedies are saved “to suitors, and not to the State courts”).
30. See Fitzgerald v. U.S. Lines Co., 374 U.S. 16, 20 (1963) (footnotes omitted) (“While this
Court has held that the Seventh Amendment does not require jury trials in admiralty cases, neither
that Amendment nor any other provision of the Constitution forbids them. Nor does any statute of
Congress or Rule of Procedure, Civil or Admiralty, forbid jury trials in maritime cases.”).
31. See cases cited supra note 16.
32. Compare dates and quantity of cases allowing removal in supra note 16 with dates and
quantity of cases prohibiting removal in supra note 17.
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the uncertainty as to whether maritime cases are in fact removable
when admiralty is the sole basis for federal jurisdiction.33 The issue
still awaits a definitive resolution.
Thus, it is a fitting time to fully elucidate the topic of maritime
removal, which has been mired in a century of prohibition34 and remains stagnant due to the specious perception that federal courts sitting in admiralty are incapable of providing a jury trial.35 Clarification
ultimately requires a careful investigation of the relevant statutes and
the separation of traditional admiralty procedure36 from admiralty jurisdiction.37 This Article aims to correct the enduring misunderstanding and establish original jurisdiction as an unqualified standard for
removal under 28 U.S.C. § 1441. Part II illuminates the erroneous historical justification for prohibiting removal based on 28 U.S.C.
§ 1441(b), which is, and has always been, inapplicable to maritime
cases. Part III of the Article examines the historical intricacies of admiralty jurisdiction and the saving-to-suitors clause to reveal how their
interaction with the evolving removal statute errantly produced a prohibition on the removal of maritime cases. Part IV presents a contemporary solution: the saving-to-suitors clause should be established as
33. See Lu Junhong v. Boeing Co., 792 F.3d 805, 818 (7th Cir. 2015) (“Our conclusion that
§ 1333(1) supplies admiralty jurisdiction shows that subject-matter jurisdiction exists. Plaintiffs
thus could have filed these suits directly in federal court (as many victims of this crash did). If the
saving-to-suitors clause allows them to stay in state court even after the 2011 amendment, they are
free to waive or forfeit that right—which given the scope of § 1331(1) concerns venue rather than
subject matter jurisdiction. Boeing therefore was entitled to remove these suits to federal court.”);
Sangha v. Navig8 Shipmanagement Priv. Ltd., 882 F.3d 96, 100 (5th Cir. 2018) (“[T]he question
of subject-matter jurisdiction presented in this case—whether the saving-to-suitors clause of the
federal maritime statute prohibits removal of general maritime claims absent an independent basis
for federal jurisdiction in light of Congress’s December 2011 amendment to the federal removal
statute—is not clear.”).
34. See, e.g., Demer v. Pac. S.S. Co., 273 F. 567, 577 (W.D. Wash. 1921) (denying removal
of a maritime case).
35. See, e.g., Barry v. Shell Oil Co., No. 13-6133, 2014 WL 775662, at *3 (E.D. La. Feb. 25,
2014) (“[S]ince the removal of Plaintiff’s claim solely on the basis of admiralty jurisdiction would
deprive him of the right to pursue his nonmaritime remedy of a jury trial, the saving to suitors clause
under these circumstances prohibits the removal of this action.”); Riley v. Llog Expl. Co., No. 14437, 2014 WL 4345002, at *4 (E.D. La. Aug. 28, 2014) (“[T]here can be no question that a plaintiff
necessarily loses his right to a jury trial when a case is removed into admiralty.”); Pierce v. Parker
Towing Co., 25 F. Supp. 3d 1372, 1390 (S.D. Ala. 2014) (“Had Plaintiffs filed the same claims in
this Court, pursuant to . . . admiralty jurisdiction . . . the remedy of trial by jury would not be available.”).
36. See FED. R. CIV. P. 9 advisory committee’s note to 1966 amendment (“One of the important procedural consequences is that in the civil action either party may demand a jury trial,
while in the suit in admiralty there is no right to jury trial except as provided by statute.”).
37. 28 U.S.C. § 1333 (2018) (“The district courts shall have original jurisdiction, exclusive of
the courts of the States, of: (1) Any civil case of admiralty or maritime jurisdiction . . . .”).
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a statute that provides the right to a jury trial after a maritime case has
been removed to federal court under admiralty jurisdiction.38 This approach both upholds the saving-to-suitors clause and does not contravene the modern standard for removal.39 By exploring the history of
the federal judiciary, this review expounds the propriety of removing
maritime cases to federal court and describes the antiquated analysis
that fostered the canonical prohibition known today.
II. 28 U.S.C. § 1441: THE REMOVAL STATUTE
A. Centuries of Statutory Evolution
For the past 100 years, courts have struggled to apply the continually evolving removal statute to maritime claims.40 While maritime
cases are never directly addressed by 28 U.S.C. § 1441 or its predecessors,41 these suits theoretically entered the purview of removal jurisdiction by statute more than a century after its creation.42 Nonetheless, in practice, courts have toiled to include maritime claims within

38. See FED. R. CIV. P. 9 advisory committee’s note to 1966 amendment (“One of the important procedural consequences is that in the civil action either party may demand a jury trial,
while in the suit in admiralty there is no right to jury trial except as provided by statute.” (emphasis
added)).
39. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (“[A]ny civil action brought in a State court of which the district
courts of the United States have original jurisdiction, may be removed . . . .” (emphasis added)).
40. See, e.g., Demer v. Pac. S.S. Co., 273 F. 567, 568, 576–77 (W.D. Wash. 1921) (“[I]t may
appear that a suit upon a tort suffered by one in the service of the ship upon navigable waters . . . is
now removable to the District Court . . . .”); Id. at 576–77. (“[I]f this cause is held to be removable,
it would seem to logically follow that a suitor, suing on account of a maritime tort at common law
in the District Court . . . could demand a jury as a matter of right. Such a radical departure from the
established practice is alone sufficient to cast doubt upon the right of removal.”).
41. See Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 12, 1 Stat. 73, 79–80 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 28 U.S.C.); Judiciary Act of 1875, ch. 137, § 2, 18 Stat. 470, 470–71; Act of Mar. 3,
1887, ch. 373, § 2, 24 Stat. 552, 553; Judicial Code of 1911, Pub. L. No. 61-475, § 28, 36 Stat.
1087, 1094–95; 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (2006).
42. See Demer, 273 F. at 575 (“As the Circuit Court had no original jurisdiction, under the
admiralty and maritime law, a cause arising thereunder could not be removed. Under the foregoing
terms of section 2, of course, there was no removal from the state court to the District Court, which
did have such original jurisdiction. By the Judicial Code, taking effect January 1, 1912, both the
original jurisdiction of the Circuit Court and its jurisdiction upon removal were transferred to, or
merged in, the District Court.”); Judicial Code of 1911 § 28 (“Any other suit of a civil nature, at
law or in equity, of which the district courts of the United States are given jurisdiction by this
title . . . may be removed into the district court of the United States . . . .”); Id. § 24 (“The district
courts shall have original jurisdiction as follows: . . . Third. Of all civil causes of admiralty and
maritime jurisdiction . . . .”).
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removal jurisdiction when considering the historical inability to remove these cases.43
Removal jurisdiction was originally created by the Judiciary Act
of 1789, but its scope was limited to cases that possessed diversity of
citizenship.44 Nearly a century passed before the removal of maritime
cases could be contemplated once the Judiciary Act of 1875 permitted
removal of suits arising under the Constitution or laws of the United
States.45 The expanded scope of the removal statute could have plausibly included maritime cases, yet these suits were understood not to
arise from the Constitution or laws of the United States.46 Consequently, the removal statute remained inapplicable to maritime claims.
In 1887, the removal statute was amended to the modern standard
of removability, which requires eligible cases be within the courts’
“original jurisdiction.”47 However, as originally enacted, this standard
for removal was based on the jurisdiction of the now defunct circuit

43. See, e.g., Coronel v. AK Victory, 1 F. Supp. 3d 1175, 1178 (W.D. Wash. 2014) (“The
court concludes, however, that it is the statutory grant of admiralty jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1333,
and more than 200 years of precedent interpreting this grant, that ultimately determine the removability of Plaintiff’s claims.”).
44. See Judiciary Act of 1789 § 12 (“[I]f a suit be commenced in any state court against an
alien, or by a citizen of the state in which the suit is brought against a citizen of another state, and
the matter in dispute exceeds . . . five hundred dollars . . . and the defendant shall, at the time of
entering his appearance in such state court, file a petition for the removal of the cause for trial into
the next circuit court . . . .”). This enactment is currently codified in 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a).
45. Judiciary Act of 1875 § 2 (“That any suit of a civil nature, at law or in equity, now pending
or hereafter brought in any State court . . . and arising under the Constitution or laws of the United
States, or treaties made . . . either party may remove said suit into the circuit court of the United
States for the proper district.”).
46. See Harold K. Watson & Ifigeneia Xanthopoulou, Evolution and Unification of the Federal Admiralty Rules and Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 92 TUL. L. REV. 1123, 1139 (2018)
(“[T]he universal understanding at the time of this amendment was that maritime cases did not arise
under the ‘Constitution or laws of the United States.’ [The Judiciary Act of 1875] therefore did not
give the courts the occasion to address whether a maritime claim filed in state court could be removed in the absence of diversity or an applicable federal statute.” (footnote omitted)); see also
Winter v. Swinburne, 8 F. 49, 54 (E.D. Wis. 1881) (“The argument is that the matter in dispute here
arises under the constitution and laws of the United States; that the decree in admiralty, which is
the foundation of this suit, is the creature of the federal laws and constitution . . . . I cannot concur
in this view.”).
47. See Act of Mar. 3, 1887, ch. 373, § 2, 24 Stat. 552, 553 (“[A]ny suit of a civil nature, at
law or in equity, arising under the Constitution or laws of the United States, or treaties made, or
which shall be made, under their authority, of which the circuit courts of the United States are given
original jurisdiction . . . may be removed by the defendant or defendants therein to the circuit court
of the United States for the proper district[;] any other suit of a civil nature, at law or in equity of
which the circuit courts of the United States are given jurisdiction . . . may be removed into the
circuit court of the United States . . . by the defendant or defendants therein being non-residents of
that state” (emphasis added)). This enactment is currently provided in 28 U.S.C. § 1441.
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courts,48 which did not have jurisdiction over maritime matters,49
thereby sustaining the exclusion of maritime cases from removal jurisdiction. A highly consequential change soon followed in 1911 when
Congress abolished the circuit courts and transferred their jurisdiction
to the district courts.50 Thereafter, removable cases had to be within
the original jurisdiction of the district courts—the standard that persists today.51 Cases that arose under the Constitution or laws of the
United States remained freely removable after 1911, but in addition,
nonresident defendants could also remove “[a]ny other suit of a civil
nature, at law or in equity, of which the district courts of the United
States [were] given jurisdiction.”52 Because the Judicial Code of 1911
maintained the district courts’ jurisdiction over maritime and admiralty claims,53 such cases would have been theoretically removable as
“other suits” after 1911 provided the defendants were not residents of
the forum state.54 The section of the removal statute that became applicable to maritime cases as “other suits” beginning in 191155 and

48. See ROBERT DESTY, THE REMOVAL OF CAUSES FROM STATE TO FEDERAL COURTS 204
(3d ed. 1893) (“Under the Act of 1887, no cause can be removed unless the circuit court would or
could have had original jurisdiction of the controversy involved.”). The former U.S. circuit courts—
not to be confused with the regional circuits for the current U.S. courts of appeals—were important
federal trial courts with limited appellate jurisdiction established by the Judiciary Act of 1789 and
abolished by the Judicial Code of 1911. See Landmark Legislation: Abolition of U.S. Circuit
Courts, FED. JUD. CTR., https://www.fjc.gov/history/legislation/landmark-legislation-abolition-uscircuit-courts [https://perma.cc/V93N-3KJD].
49. See Demer v. Pac. S.S. Co., 273 F. 567, 575 (W.D. Wash. 1921) (As the Circuit Court had
no original jurisdiction, under admiralty and maritime law, a cause arising thereunder could not be
removed.”); see also Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 9, 1 Stat. 73, 77 (“That the district courts shall
have . . . exclusive original cognizance of all civil causes of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction . . . .”).
50. See Landmark Legislation, supra note 48.
51. See Judicial Code of 1911, Pub. L. No. 61-475, § 28, 36 Stat. 1087, 1094–95 (“Any other
suit of a civil nature, at law or in equity, of which the district courts of the United States are given
jurisdiction by this title . . . may be removed into the district court of the United States . . . .”); 28
U.S.C. § 1441(a) (2018) (“[A]ny civil action brought in a State court of which the district courts of
the United States have original jurisdiction, may be removed . . . .”).
52. Judicial Code of 1911 § 28.
53. Judicial Code of 1911 § 24 (“The district courts shall have original jurisdiction as follows: . . . Third. Of all civil causes of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction . . . .”).
54. See 14A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3674,
630–31 (4th ed. 2013) (“There does not appear to be any statutory reason for denying a defendant
who is not a citizen of the state in which the federal court is sitting the right to remove a state
initiated maritime action brought under the savings clause.”).
55. See Judicial Code of 1911 § 28. This enactment is currently provided in 28 U.S.C. section
1441(b).
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remaining pertinent until amended by the JVCA would eventually be
known as the Forum Defendant Rule (FDR).56
While the nascent FDR theoretically allowed removal of maritime claims,57 it surprisingly evolved into the section of the removal
statute that would function to prohibit removal thereafter.58 After
1911, the main removal clause restricted removal of cases within the
district courts’ original jurisdiction to those that arose under the Constitution and laws of the United States59 (which did not include maritime cases),60 and the nascent FDR further permitted nonresident defendants to remove “other suits” within the courts’ original
jurisdiction.61 When the modern judicial code was created in 1948, the
main removal clause’s requirement that cases arise under the Constitution and laws of the United States was abrogated62 and removal became governed exclusively by the district courts’ original

56. See Aaron E. Hankel, Note, On the Road to the Merits in Our Federal System: Is the
“Forum Defendant Rule” a Procedural Speed Bump or a Jurisdictional Road Block?, 28 WASH.
U.J.L. & POL’Y 427, 434 (2008) (citations omitted) (“Yet, where removal is predicated upon the
diversity of the litigants, Congress rejected a per se right to removal and conditioned the defendant’s right to remove upon his relation to the forum state. This restriction is embodied in § 1441(b),
and has been dubbed the Forum Defendant Rule.” (footnotes omitted)).
57. See Judicial Code of 1911 § 28 (“Any other suit of a civil nature, at law or in equity, of
which the district courts of the United States are given jurisdiction by this title . . . may be removed
into the district court of the United States for the proper district by the defendant or defendants
therein, being nonresidents of that state.”). This enactment is currently provided in 28 U.S.C. section 1441(b).
58. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b) (2006) (“Any civil action of which the district courts have original
jurisdiction founded on a claim or right arising under the Constitution, treaties or laws of the United
States shall be removable without regard to the citizenship or residence of the parties. Any other
such action shall be removable only if none of the parties in interest properly joined and served as
defendants is a citizen of the State in which such action is brought.”); In re Dutile, 935 F.2d 61, 63
(5th Cir. 1991) (“The practical effect of [§ 1441(b)] is to prevent the removal of admiralty claims
pursuant to § 1441(a) unless there is complete diversity of citizenship . . . .”).
59. See Judicial Code of 1911 § 28 (“Any suit of a civil nature, at law or in equity, arising
under the Constitution or laws of the United States, or treaties made . . . of which the district courts
of the United States are given original jurisdiction by this title . . . may be removed by the defendant . . . .”). This enactment is currently provided in 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b).
60. See Watson & Xanthopoulou, supra note 46, at 1139.
61. See Judicial Code of 1911 § 28 (“Any other suit of a civil nature, at law or in equity, of
which the district courts of the United States are given jurisdiction by this title . . . may be removed
into the district court of the United States for the proper district by the defendant or defendants
therein, being nonresidents of that state.”). This enactment is currently provided in 28 U.S.C.
§ 1441(b).
62. See Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 646, § 1441(a), 62 Stat. 869, 937–38 (codified at 28 U.S.C.
§ 1441(a)) (“Except as otherwise expressly provided by Act of Congress, any civil action brought
in a State court of which the district courts of the United States have original jurisdiction may be
removed by the defendant . . . .”).
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jurisdiction,63 which did include maritime cases.64 Consequently, after
1948, removal of maritime claims would have been allowable under
the main removal clause, 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a),65 while the codified
FDR, 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b),66 became a clawback provision that prohibited citizen defendants from removing cases that did not arise under
the Constitution and the laws of the United States—including maritime cases.67 The removal statute went nearly unchanged until the
JVCA in 2011.68 At this point, the FDR, which was formerly applicable to all cases that did not arise under the Constitution and laws of the
United States,69 was clarified according to its genuine purpose70: to
exclusively control removal based on diversity of citizenship.71

63. See id.; see also Sabin v. Home Owners’ Loan Corp., 147 F.2d 653, 655–56 (10th Cir.
1945) (“The test for determining the removability of an action is whether the United States Court
might have exercised original jurisdiction.”); Nyberg v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 123 F. Supp.
599, 602–03 (W.D. Mich. 1954) (“The test as to whether the defendant was entitled to remove the
present civil action from the State court to this Federal district court, is whether this court would
have had original jurisdiction of the action.”).
64. See 28 U.S.C. § 1333 (1952) (“The district courts shall have original jurisdiction, exclusive of the courts of the States, of: (1) Any civil case of admiralty or maritime jurisdiction . . . .”).
65. See id. § 1441(a) (1952) (“Except as otherwise expressly provided by Act of Congress,
any civil action brought in a State court of which the district courts of the United States have original jurisdiction may be removed by the defendant . . . .”).
66. See id. § 1441(b) (1952) (“Any civil action . . . founded on a claim or right arising under
the Constitution, treaties or laws of the United States shall be removable without regard to the
citizenship or residence of the parties. Any other such action shall be removable only if none of the
parties in interest properly joined and served as defendants is a citizen of the State in which such
action is brought.”).
67. See Watson & Xanthopoulou, supra note 46, at 1139–40.
68. See The Federal Courts Jurisdiction and Venue Clarification Act of 2011, Pub. L. 112-63,
§ 103, 125 Stat. 758, 759.
69. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b) (2006) (“Any civil action of which the district courts have original
jurisdiction founded on a claim or right arising under the Constitution, treaties or laws of the United
States shall be removable without regard to the citizenship or residence of the parties. Any other
such action shall be removable only if none of the parties in interest properly joined and served as
defendants is a citizen of the State in which such action is brought.”).
70. See Comment, Judicial Code Section 1441 and Federal Admiralty Jurisdiction, 10 STAN.
L. REV. 168, 170 (1957) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b)) (“1441(b) . . . divides all removable cases
into two classes: (1) ‘[A]ctions arising under the Constitution, treaties, or laws of the United States’;
(2) Actions in which ‘none of the parties in interest properly joined and served as defendants is a
citizen of the State in which such action is brought.’ The second class obviously refers only to
diversity and alienage cases.” (alteration in original)); see also H.R. REP. NO. 112-10, at 12 (2011)
(“Proposed paragraph 1441(b)(2) restates the substance of the last sentence of current subsection
1441(b), which relates only to diversity.”).
71. See The Federal Courts Jurisdiction and Venue Clarification Act of 2011 § 103 (“A civil
action otherwise removable solely on the basis of the jurisdiction under section 1332(a) of this title
[diversity jurisdiction] may not be removed if any of the parties in interest properly joined and
served as defendants is a citizen of the State in which such action is brought.”).
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Diversity jurisdiction was originally created to allow out-of-state
defendants to evade the potential for local bias in state courts.72 The
limitation imposed by the FDR prevents defendants who are citizens
of the forum state, and therefore not subject to bias, from removing
cases to federal court.73 The FDR’s limitation eventually extended to
“other suits,”74 but its basic premise began as a central requirement for
removal on the basis of diversity in the Judiciary Act of 1789.75 When
the JVCA clarified the FDR to exclude all non-diversity of citizenship
cases,76 it restored the FDR’s original embodiment and corroborated
the diversity-specific purpose of the rule.77
In the absence of the rationale for diversity jurisdiction—namely,
prejudice based on citizenship—application of the FDR is inappropriate. Courts have understandably strained to apply the FDR’s citizenship requirements to maritime claims78 and have repeatedly recognized its irrelevance to these cases.79 The struggle to finagle maritime

72. See Hankel, supra note 56, at 434 (“[W]here the basis for removal is diversity of citizenship, the defendant’s right to remove the litigation from a state court of competent jurisdiction to
the federal courts only exists where the defendant is not a resident of the forum state. This restriction
is reasonable considering the rationale for removal of diversity actions, namely the possibility for
bias against an out-of-state defendant.” (footnotes omitted)).
73. See id. (“Yet, where removal is predicated upon the diversity of the litigants, Congress
rejected a per se right to removal and conditioned the defendant’s right to remove upon his relation
to the forum state. This restriction is embodied in § 1441(b), and has been dubbed the Forum Defendant Rule.” (footnotes omitted)).
74. See Judicial Code of 1911, Pub. L. No. 61-475, § 28, 36 Stat. 1087, 1094–95 (“Any other
suit of a civil nature, at law or in equity, of which the district courts of the United States are given
jurisdiction by this title . . . may be removed into the district court of the United States for the proper
district by the defendant or defendants therein, being nonresidents of that State.”). This enactment
is currently provided in 28 U.S.C. § 1441.
75. See Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 12, 1 Stat. 73, 79–80 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 28 U.S.C.) (“[I]f a suit be commenced in any state court against an alien, or by a citizen
of the state in which the suit is brought against a citizen of another state, and the matter in dispute
exceeds . . . five hundred dollars . . . and the defendant shall, at the time of entering his appearance
in such state court, file a petition for the removal of the cause for trial into the next circuit
court . . . .” (emphasis added)).
76. See supra note 15.
77. See supra notes 69–73 and accompanying text.
78. See, e.g., J.J. Ryan & Sons, Inc. v. Cont’l Ins. Co., 369 F. Supp. 692, 697–98 (D.S.C. 1974)
(holding that removal of maritime claims was improper even though the court had original jurisdiction and defendant was not a citizen of the forum state).
79. See Barker v. Hercules Offshore, Inc., 713 F.3d 208, 230 (5th Cir. 2013) (citation omitted)
(“Absent diversity . . . it simply does not make any sense to make removal of a saving-clause case
turn on whether one of the defendants is a citizen of the forum state. The fortuity of citizenship is
totally irrelevant to the policy factors germane to the removal question under discussion.” (quoting
WRIGHT, supra note 14, at § 3674); Tenn. Gas Pipeline v. Houston Cas. Ins. Co., 87 F.3d 150, 156
(5th Cir. 1996) (“We recognize that it may be a distortion of the legal scheme to decide this case
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cases within the FDR prior to the JVCA resulted in a prevalent yet
perplexing interpretation that the FDR, a limitation on diversity
cases,80 actually required diverse citizenship among parties to remove
a maritime case.81 Yet, this interpretation was largely a disguised prohibition on removal because diversity independently affords federal
jurisdiction, regardless of the maritime nature of the claims.82
While the JVCA might have amended the FDR, it did not change
the FDR’s original purpose or applicability to maritime cases.83 As a
result, inclusion of maritime claims within the purview of the FDR is,
and has always been, a nonsensical basis to regulate the removability
of maritime cases. The JVCA merely made this understanding explicit.84 The majority of district courts that denied removal of maritime
cases following the JVCA were consequently correct to conclude that
the amended FDR should not affect the removability of maritime
claims,85 yet given the unabating irrelevance of the FDR, it should
never have restricted or theoretically allowed removal of these suits in
the first place.
on the citizenship of [the defendant]. . . . [T]he language of the second sentence supports removal,
though the purpose of the sentence (diversity) is arguably irrelevant to our case.”).
80. See Lively v. Wild Oats Mkts., Inc., 456 F.3d 933, 939 (9th Cir. 2006) (“Separate and
apart from the statute conferring diversity jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1332, § 1441(b) confines removal on the basis of diversity jurisdiction to instances where no defendant is a citizen of the forum
state.”); see also H.R. REP. NO. 112-10, at 12 (2011) (“Proposed paragraph 1441(b)(2) restates the
substance of the last sentence of current subsection 1441(b), which relates only to diversity.”).
81. See Michael F. Sturley, Removal into Admiralty: The Removal of State-Court Maritime
Cases to Federal Court, 46 J. MAR. L. & COM. 105, 117 (2015) (“Under section 1441(b)’s second
sentence (at that time), the forum-defendant constraint barred removal in all cases except federal
question cases when a proper defendant was a citizen of the forum state. On that basis, the Dutile
court concluded ‘that the “practical effect of these provisions is to prevent removal of admiralty
claims pursuant to § 1441(a) unless there is complete diversity of citizenship (predicated upon outof-state defendants) . . . . A defendant who desires to remove a maritime action from state court
must establish diversity jurisdiction.’” (omission in original) (footnote omitted) (quoting In re Dutile, 935 F.2d 61, 63 (5th Cir. 1991))).
82. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2018). Diversity of citizenship jurisdiction also has an amount in
controversy requirement. See id.
83. See Hankel, supra note 56, at 434 (“[W]here the basis for removal is diversity of citizenship, the defendant’s right to remove the litigation from a state court of competent jurisdiction to
the federal courts only exists where the defendant is not a resident of the forum state. This restriction
is reasonable considering the rationale for removal of diversity actions, namely the possibility for
bias against an out-of-state defendant.” (footnote omitted)); id. (“Yet, where removal is predicated
upon the diversity of the litigants, Congress rejected a per se right to removal and conditioned the
defendant’s right to remove upon his relation to the forum state. This restriction is embodied in
§ 1441(b), and has been dubbed the Forum Defendant Rule.” (footnote omitted)).
84. See H.R. REP. NO. 112-10, at 12 (“This change is intended to make it easier for litigants
to locate the provisions that apply uniquely to diversity removal.”).
85. See cases cited supra note 17.
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Intriguingly, if Congress chose to expressly exclude non-diversity
cases from the purview of the early FDR prior to the creation of the
judicial code in 1948—when the nascent FDR served as the allowance, rather than the limitation to removal86—this action would have
actually prevented removal of maritime cases. Such an arbitrary result
further evidences the irrationality of using the FDR to govern maritime
removal. The former influences of the FDR to maritime cases should
have been disregarded, and following the JVCA, fortunately they must
be. The standard for removal remains inarguably founded on the district courts’ original jurisdiction,87 and no exceptions for maritime
cases—express or contrived—currently exist within the removal statute or its exceptions.88 Several courts understandably permitted removal of maritime cases based on the plain language of the amended
removal statute following the JVCA.89 Nevertheless, this seemingly
novel capacity within the federal judiciary would prove to be controversial.
B. Judicial Vacillation
The modern debate regarding the removability of maritime claims
has revolved around the 2013 Southern District of Texas case, Ryan v.
Hercules Offshore, Inc.90 Ryan has served as the face of the maritime
removal cause, yet it was not the first case to employ a four-corners
reading of 28 U.S.C. § 1441 to allow removal of maritime claims.91 In
fact, several courts in the 1950s acknowledged the possibility of removing maritime cases provided the defendant was not a citizen of the
forum state in compliance with the FDR.92 However, by the end of the

86. See Judicial Code of 1911, Pub. L. No. 61-475, § 28, 36 Stat. 1087, 1094–95 (“Any other
suit of a civil nature, at law or in equity, of which the district courts of the United States are given
jurisdiction by this title . . . may be removed into the district court of the United States for the proper
district by the defendant or defendants therein, being nonresidents of that State.”).
87. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (2018) (“Except as otherwise expressly provided by Act of Congress, any civil action brought in a State court of which the district courts of the United States have
original jurisdiction, may be removed by the defendant . . . .”).
88. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1441, 1445 (2018).
89. See cases cited supra note 16.
90. 945 F. Supp. 2d 772 (S.D. Tex. 2013).
91. See, e.g., Davis v. Matson Navigation Co., 143 F. Supp. 537, 538–39 (N.D. Cal. 1956)
(permitting removal of a maritime case).
92. See id.; Crispin Co. v. Lykes Bros. S.S. Co., 134 F. Supp. 704, 707 (S.D. Tex. 1955) (acknowledging that removal of maritime cases does not require diversity jurisdiction); Crawford v.
E. Asiatic Co., 156 F. Supp. 571, 572–74 (N.D. Cal. 1957) (stating that removal would have been
proper if the defendant was not a citizen of the forum state).
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1950s, courts entirely discounted removal of maritime cases after the
Supreme Court discouraged the practice in Romero v. International
Terminal Operating Co.93
Despite its influence, Romero did not actually involve removal.94
Further, Romero’s commonly cited dictum opposing removal of maritime cases analyzed whether these suits could be removed under federal question jurisdiction95—an impossibility recognized since removal based on federal question jurisdiction was created.96 Romero
also did nothing to alter the unanimous understanding that maritime
cases were considered “other actions” under 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b),97
and thus, should have been removable as long as no defendant was a
citizen of the forum state.98 Nonetheless, courts found Romero’s dictum99 to be persuasive and subsequently began patently denying removal of maritime cases on that basis, independent of the citizenship
standard in the FDR.100 The topic remained dormant for decades.
The JVCA reignited the debate in 2011 by rendering the belabored inclusion of maritime suits within the FDR meritless.101 The
Ryan court was the first to meaningfully act on the amended removal
statute as it applied to maritime cases. In Ryan, the court analyzed the
JVCA amended removal statute and concluded that its unambiguous

93. 358 U.S. 354 (1959). See, e.g., Harbor Boating Club of Huntington, N.Y., Inc. v. Red Star
Towing & Transp. Co., 179 F. Supp. 755, 756–57 (E.D.N.Y. 1960) (denying removal of a maritime
case based on dicta from Romero, 358 U.S. at 371–72).
94. See Romero, 358 U.S. at 355–58.
95. See id. at 371–72 (discussing the procedural difficulties that would ensue from including
maritime cases within federal question jurisdiction).
96. See Watson & Xanthopoulou, supra note 46, at 1139–42.
97. See In re Dutile, 935 F.2d 61, 63 (5th Cir. 1991) (“[A]dmiralty and general maritime
claims fall within the category of ‘[a]ny other [civil] action’ governed by the second sentence of
§ 1441(b).” (second and third alterations in original)).
98. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b) (1952).
99. See Romero, 358 U.S. at 372 (“By making maritime cases removable to the federal courts
it would make considerable inroads into the traditionally exercised concurrent jurisdiction of the
state courts in admiralty matters—a jurisdiction which it was the unquestioned aim of the savings
clause of 1789 to preserve.”).
100. See WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 54, at 628. (“[I]n a number of cases federal courts have
read the Romero [sic] dictum as meaning that maritime litigation brought in state courts cannot be
removed to federal courts unless diversity of citizenship or another independent ground of federal
subject-matter jurisdiction exists.”).
101. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b) (2018) (“(1) In determining whether a civil action is removable
on the basis of the jurisdiction under section 1332(a) of this title [diversity jurisdiction], the citizenship of defendants sued under fictitious names shall be disregarded.”); H.R. REP. NO. 112-10,
at 12 (2011) (“Proposed paragraph 1441(b)(2) restates the substance of the last sentence of current
subsection 1441(b), which relates only to diversity.”).

(7) 55_SCHWARTZ_V10.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2022]

REMOVING MARITIME CASES TO FEDERAL COURT

2/4/22 1:27 PM

47

language no longer prevented removal of maritime cases.102 In making
this conclusion, the Ryan court overlooked the congressional intent of
the JVCA amendment103 and gave only a superficial, albeit correct,
appraisal of the potential limitations to removal within the saving-tosuitors clause.104 Following the decision in Ryan,105 other courts in the
Eastern and Southern Districts of Texas and the Middle District of
Louisiana similarly allowed removal of maritime cases.106 Yet, the decisions from Ryan and its progeny were widely criticized and disavowed by other courts,107 and later even by the judge who decided
Ryan.108 The reasoning in Ryan was denounced on two major bases:
first, it was argued that the JVCA amendment to the removal statute
was insufficient to overcome centuries of practice and precedent without the congressional intent to effect such a change;109 and second, it
was argued that in the absence of a prohibition within the FDR,110 the
saving-to-suitors clause remained an additional act of Congress within
the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a)111 that barred removal.112

102. Ryan v. Hercules Offshore, Inc., 945 F. Supp. 2d 722, 779 (S.D. Tex. 2013) (“[A]ll of
Plaintiffs claims are admiralty claims over which a federal district court has original jurisdiction
and the revised removal statute does not limit the removal of these claims.”).
103. See id. at 777 (“While it is possible that Congress did not intend for the changes to section
1441 to be substantive, it nevertheless made substantial changes to the text of section 1441(b). The
new statute does not contain any ambiguous language.”).
104. See id. at 774.
105. Id. at 779.
106. See cases cited supra note 16.
107. See cases cited supra note 17.
108. See Sanders v. Cambrian Consultants (CC) Am., Inc., 132 F. Supp. 3d 853, 858 (S.D. Tex.
2015) (denying removal of a maritime case).
109. See, e.g., Coronel v. AK Victory, 1 F. Supp. 3d 1175, 1178 (W.D. Wash. 2014) (“The
court concludes, however, that it is the statutory grant of admiralty jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1333,
and more than 200 years of precedent interpreting this grant, that ultimately determine the removability of Plaintiff’s claims.”).
110. See In re Dutile, 935 F.2d 61, 63 (5th Cir. 1991) (“The practical effect of [§ 1441(b)] is to
prevent the removal of admiralty claims pursuant to § 1441(a) unless there is complete diversity of
citizenship . . . .”).
111. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (2018) (“Except as otherwise expressly provided by Act of Congress,
any civil action brought in a State court of which the district courts of the United States have original jurisdiction, may be removed by the defendant or the defendants . . . .” (emphasis added)).
112. See, e.g., Pierce v. Parker Towing Co., 25 F. Supp. 3d 1372, 1383 (S.D. Ala. 2014)
(“§ 1333(1) remains an Act of Congress that limits the Court’s removal jurisdiction by ‘saving to
suitors’ common law remedies . . . .”); A.E.A. ex rel. Angelopoulos v. Volvo Penta of the Ams.,
LLC, 77 F. Supp. 3d 481, 491 (E.D. Va. 2015) (“[T]he saving to suitors clause, which establishes
concurrent jurisdiction over maritime cases, is an Act of Congress in which Congress has expressly
provided an exception to an otherwise removable action under § 1441.”); Barry v. Shell Oil Co.,
No. 13-6133, 2014 WL 775662, at *3 (E.D. La. Feb. 25, 2014) (“[S]ince the removal of Plaintiff’s
claim solely on the basis of admiralty jurisdiction would deprive him of the right to pursue his
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These arguments boil down to a similar premise as the basis for
the historical practice of excluding maritime claims from removal jurisdiction is the saving-to-suitors clause.113 However, the saving-tosuitors clause is not an outright prohibition on removal because state
maritime cases brought pursuant to the saving-to-suitors clause have
always been removable with an independent basis for jurisdiction such
as diversity.114 Given the importance of the saving-to-suitors clause
within the maritime removal debate, determining how it should be
contextualized in the modern judiciary is essential to elucidating the
removability of maritime cases.115
III. THE SAVING-TO-SUITORS CLAUSE
A. Creation and Rationale
Despite the apparent significance of the saving-to-suitors clause
to the topic of maritime removal, the saving-to-suitors clause predated
the statutory possibility of removing a maritime case by more than a
century.116 Nonetheless, in order to determine whether the saving-tosuitors clause can presently operate as a bar to maritime removal, it is
necessary to clarify its historical purpose and scope—an inquiry that
begins multiple centuries ago.
The traditional character of admiralty jurisdiction was originally
brought to the colonies from England in 1696 with the establishment
of vice-admiralty courts.117 These courts proceeded in the tradition of
English admiralty law, which adjudicated maritime disputes without a
nonmaritime remedy of a jury trial, the saving to suitors clause under these circumstances prohibits
the removal of this action.”).
113. See Romero v. Int’l Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354, 372 (1959) (“By making maritime cases removable to the federal courts it would make considerable inroads into the traditionally
exercised concurrent jurisdiction of the state courts in admiralty matters—a jurisdiction which it
was the unquestioned aim of the savings clause of 1789 to preserve.”).
114. See Poirrier v. Nicklos Drilling Co., 648 F.2d 1063, 1066 (5th Cir. 1981) (“The ‘saving to
suitors’ clause does no more than preserve the right of maritime suitors to pursue nonmaritime
remedies. It does not guarantee them a nonfederal forum, or limit the right of defendants to remove
such actions to federal court where there exists some basis for federal jurisdiction other than admiralty.” (first and second emphases in original)).
115. See Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 9, 1 Stat. 73, 76–77 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 28 U.S.C.).
116. The saving-to-suitors clause was enacted in 1789. Id. Maritime cases entered the purview
of the removal statute as “other suits” in 1911. See Judicial Code of 1911, Pub. L. No. 61-475, § 28,
36 Stat. 1087, 1094.
117. See Raymond S. August, Trial by Jury in a Court of Admiralty: A Constitutional Right
Buried Under Historical Ignorance, 13 J. MAR. L. & COM. 149, 154 (1982).

(7) 55_SCHWARTZ_V10.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2022]

REMOVING MARITIME CASES TO FEDERAL COURT

2/4/22 1:27 PM

49

jury.118 Even after the creation of vice-admiralty courts, plaintiffs
maintained the option of filing their maritime suits in state courts of
common law, which afforded the right to a jury trial.119 After the Declaration of Independence, vice-admiralty courts subsequently became
state admiralty courts.120 Thereafter, maritime cases were tried either
in jury utilizing state admiralty courts, which employed questionable
practices, or by regular state courts utilizing jury trials embroiled with
local bias.121 The ham-handed application of maritime law and justice
by these courts, which commonly adjudicated in rem actions seizing
vessels,122 led to domestic and international strife and a reevaluation
of whether jury trials should be employed in maritime cases.123 As a
result, the framers had good reason to institute a juryless federal judiciary to adjudicate maritime cases with the knowledge that jury trials
had previously been a source of bias and inconsistency.124 Indeed, Alexander Hamilton expressed reservations about jury trials for adjudicating in rem maritime cases in The Federalist 83125—a sentiment that
was heeded in the newly minted federal judiciary’s command of admiralty jurisdiction.126

118. See Joseph C. Sweeney, The Silver Oar and Other Maces of the Admiralty: Admiralty
Jurisdiction in America and the British Empire, 38 J. MAR. L. & COM. 159, 164 (2007).
119. See Force, supra note 27.
120. Graydon S. Staring, The Admiralty Jurisdiction of Torts and Crimes and the Failed Search
for Its Purposes, 38 J. MAR. L. & COM. 433, 450 (2007).
121. See Gary T. Sacks & Neal W. Settergren, Juries Should Not Be Trusted to Decide Admiralty Cases, 34 J. MAR. L. & COM. 163, 164–65 (2003) (citing 1 THOMAS J. SCHOENBAUM,
ADMIRALTY AND MARITIME LAW (3d ed. 2001)).
122. See ROBERT FORCE, ADMIRALTY AND MARITIME LAW 31 (Kris Markarian ed., Federal
Judicial Center 2d ed. 2013) (“A second possibility for vindicating a maritime claim is for the
plaintiff to bring an action in rem directly against the property—typically a vessel—that relates to
the claim. In such cases, the vessel—not the vessel’s owner—is the defendant.”).
123. See Sacks & Settergren, supra note 121.
124. See Steven E. Goldman & Michael I. Goldman, Is the Jury Still Out? The Controversy
Over the Traditional Rule Requiring a Non-Jury Trial in Marine Insurance Declaratory Judgment
Actions in Federal Court, 41 J. MAR. L. & COM. 117, 139 (2010).
125. THE FEDERALIST NO. 83 (Alexander Hamilton) (“I feel a deep and deliberate conviction
that there are many cases in which the trial by jury is an ineligible one. I think it so particularly in
cases which concern the public peace with foreign nations that is, in most cases where the question
turns wholly on the laws of nations. Of this nature, among others, are all prize causes [(i.e., in rem
cases)]. Juries cannot be supposed competent to investigations that require a thorough knowledge
of the laws and usages of nations; and they will sometimes be under the influence of impressions
which will not suffer them to pay sufficient regard to those considerations of public policy which
ought to guide their inquiries.”).
126. See Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 9, 1 Stat. 73, 77 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 28 U.S.C.) (“And the trial of issues in fact, in the district courts, in all causes except
civil causes of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, shall be by jury.”).
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The Judiciary Act of 1789 proceeded to give federal courts “exclusive original cognizance of all civil causes of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction”127 where such cases were to proceed without a right
to a jury trial in the traditional character of admiralty courts.128 Yet,
the drafters of the Act did not want admiralty jurisdiction to become
compulsory for adjudicating all maritime claims, and consequently,
deprive both plaintiffs of a jury trial within a state forum and states of
jurisdiction for maritime claims within their borders.129 The saving-tosuitors clause was consequently included “probably from abundant
caution”130 to unquestionably preserve a state court’s ability to adjudicate maritime matters.131 As a result, in order for the saving-to-suitors clause to prevent removal of maritime cases, the specific protections it provides would need to be deprived upon removal to federal
court.
B. What Exactly Is Saved?
The safeguards maintained by the saving-to-suitors clause—comprising the jury trial and the state forum—were rational given the nature of the pre-federal judiciary. At this judicial stage, only state courts
provided the right to a jury trial in maritime cases,132 while vice-admiralty courts proceeded exclusively without a jury.133 Thus, in the prefederal judiciary, the act of divesting state court jurisdiction would
have also eliminated the right to a jury trial in maritime cases, hence
the rationale for the explicit protections of the saving-to-suitors clause
going forward.134 The new federal judiciary largely emulated the pre127. Id.
128. See Sweeney, supra note 118 and accompanying text.
129. See Steamboat Co. v. Chase, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 522, 527 (1872) (“Yet ‘the clause was
inserted,’ says this court, ‘probably from abundant caution, lest the exclusive terms in which the
power is confirmed in the District Court might be deemed to have taken away the concurrent remedy which had before existed.’ The same right would have existed had no such clause been inserted.” (quoting N.J. Steam Navigation Co. v. Merchs.’ Bank of Bos., 47 U.S. (6 How.) 344, 390
(1848)).
130. Id. (quoting N.J. Steam Navigation, 47 U.S. (6 How.) at 390.).
131. See Force, supra note 27, at 1023 (“Thus, the Judiciary Act’s grant of concurrent jurisdiction did not create ‘a novel jurisdictional system, but rather merely had codified an old one. In
essence, the Saving-to-Suitors Clause merely preserved the status quo.’” (quoting STEVEN L.
SNELL, COURTS OF ADMIRALTY AND THE COMMON LAW: ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN
EXPERIMENT IN CONCURRENT JURISDICTION 319 (2d ed. 2007))).
132. See Force, supra note 27, at 1022–23.
133. See Sweeney, supra note 118 and accompanying text.
134. See Steamboat Co., 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 527 (“Yet ‘the clause was inserted,’ says this
court, ‘probably from abundant caution, lest the exclusive terms in which the power is confirmed
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federal judiciary by functioning as a juryless court of admiralty135
while allowing jury trials for maritime cases in state courts, which
maintained concurrent jurisdiction.136 In this framework, it would
have been irrelevant whether the saving-to-suitors clause in fact protected the state forum itself or the right to a jury trial because the two
were inextricable. In the contemporaneous absence of a mechanism
for a defendant to remove a maritime case out of state court, plaintiffs
were guaranteed their choice of forum after filing. This changed in
theory once maritime claims unsuspectingly entered the purview of
removal jurisdiction over a century later.137
Theoretically, removing a maritime case to a prototypic, juryless
admiralty court would undoubtedly violate the saving-to-suitors
clause by necessarily divesting plaintiffs of both their choice of remedy and forum.138 Yet, the federal judiciary is not constrained in its
jurisdiction or its remedies like the vice-admiralty courts from the colonial era,139 allowing federal courts to adjudicate cases either in admiralty or at law.140 The first contemplation of maritime case removal
based on admiralty jurisdiction should have given proper deference to
the versatile federal judiciary, which provides jury trials in most
cases.141 At this point, it would have been necessary to tease apart
whether the saving-to-suitors clause protects the state forum—thereby
unequivocally preventing removal and ending the analysis—or alternatively, the underlying right to a jury trial. The latter scenario
in the District Court might be deemed to have taken away the concurrent remedy which had before
existed.’ The same right would have existed had no such clause been inserted.” (quoting N.J. Steam
Navigation, 47 U.S. (6 How.) at 390)).
135. See Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 9, 1 Stat. 73, 76–77 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 28 U.S.C.).
136. See Lewis v. Lewis & Clark Marine, Inc., 531 U.S. 438, 445 (2001) (“Thus, the saving to
suitors clause preserves remedies and the concurrent jurisdiction of state courts over some admiralty and maritime claims.”).
137. See Judicial Code of 1911, Pub. L. No. 61-475, § 28, 36 Stat. 1087, 1094–95 (“Any other
suit of a civil nature, at law or in equity, of which the district courts of the United States are given
jurisdiction by this title . . . may be removed into the district court of the United States . . . .”).
138. See supra notes 117–118 and accompanying text.
139. See supra note 118 and accompanying text.
140. Comment, Removal to Admiralty, 69 YALE L.J. 442, 442–43 (1960) (“Pursuant to the initial clause of [the Judiciary Act of 1789], federal admiralty jurisdiction is exercised on the admiralty side of the district courts, with a separate docket and procedure. . . . A maritime plaintiff with
a saving-clause action thus can sue in admiralty, in state court, or, if he can meet the jurisdictional
requirements, on the law side of federal court.”).
141. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 9, 1 Stat. 73, 77 (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 28 U.S.C.) (“And the trial of issues in fact, in the district courts, in all causes except civil causes
of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, shall be by jury.”).
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preserves the possibility that maritime cases can be removed as long
as common law remedies such as jury trials are provided in federal
court.
Early Supreme Court cases decided before maritime case removal
was even entertained conclusively establish that the saving-to-suitors
clause was intended to protect the remedy and not necessarily the forum.142 This is not surprising considering the plain language of the
saving-to-suitors clause states that remedies are saved.143 Consistent
with this language, the Supreme Court in 1866 stated in The Moses
Taylor that, “[i]t is not a remedy in the common-law courts which is
saved, but a common-law remedy.”144 Shortly thereafter, in 1868, the
Supreme Court reiterated this stance in The Belfast, which concluded
that common law remedies are saved “to suitors, and not to the State
courts.”145 Subsequent Supreme Court and circuit court decisions have
corroborated this position.146 Thus, the saving-to-suitors clause does
not inherently protect a plaintiff’s choice to litigate in state court. Rather, it protects a maritime plaintiff’s right to a jury trial, which was
historically only available in state court.
As a de facto safeguard of the common law remedy, the savingto-suitors clause would only function to protect the state forum—
thereby preventing removal—if federal courts sitting in admiralty are
wholly incapable of providing jury trials. Despite misconceptions to
the contrary, this is not in fact the case.147
142. See The Moses Taylor, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 411, 431 (1866); The Belfast, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.)
624, 644 (1868).
143. 28 U.S.C. § 1333 (2018) (“[S]aving to suitors in all cases all other remedies to which they
are otherwise entitled.”) (emphasis added).
144. The Moses Taylor, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at 431.
145. The Belfast, 74 U.S. (7. Wall.) at 644.
146. See Poirrier v. Nicklos Drilling Co., 648 F.2d 1063, 1066 (5th Cir. 1981) (“The ‘saving to
suitors’ clause does no more than preserve the right of maritime suitors to pursue nonmaritime
remedies. It does not guarantee them a nonfederal forum . . . .” (emphasis omitted)); Romero v.
Int’l Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354, 407 (1959) (Brennan, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part) (“[T]he common-law remedies saved to suitors could properly be enforced in any
tribunal otherwise having jurisdiction; the remedies saved were saved generally to suitors without
discrimination as to any tribunal.”); Red Cross Line v. Atl. Fruit Co., 264 U.S. 109, 123–24 (1924)
(“The ‘right of a common-law remedy’, [sic] so saved to suitors . . . include[s] all means other than
proceedings in admiralty which may be employed to enforce the right or to redress the injury involved.”); Lewis v. Lewis & Clark Marine, Inc., 531 U.S. 438, 445 (2001) (“Thus, the saving to
suitors clause preserves remedies and the concurrent jurisdiction of state courts over some admiralty and maritime claims.”).
147. See FED. R. CIV. P. 9 advisory committee’s note to 1966 amendment (“One of the important procedural consequences is that in the civil action either party may demand a jury trial,
while in the suit in admiralty there is no right to jury trial except as provided by statute” (emphasis
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IV. ADAPTING THE SAVING-TO-SUITORS CLAUSE INTO THE MODERN
JUDICIARY
A. Shedding Antiquated Notions
History’s misplaced prohibition on the removal of maritime cases
largely arises from the distinction between admiralty jurisdiction148
and admiralty procedure.149 The belief that admiralty jurisdiction necessarily begets canonical admiralty procedure has led to the misunderstanding that courts sitting in admiralty can never provide a jury.150
While there is no right to a jury trial under prototypic admiralty procedure,151 the Supreme Court has stated that: “[T]he Seventh Amendment does not require jury trials in admiralty cases, [yet] neither that
Amendment nor any other provision of the Constitution forbids them.
Nor does any statute of Congress or Rule of Procedure, Civil or Admiralty, forbid jury trials in maritime cases.”152
In fact, there is no official basis for requiring admiralty cases to
proceed without a jury beyond tradition and custom.153 The absence
of jury trials in admiralty cases—primarily for in rem cases—was sensible given the intractable jury practices within early state admiralty
and common law courts that adjudicated maritime cases.154 Nonetheless, both the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Supreme Court
added)); see, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1873 (2018) (“In any case of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction . . .
concerning any vessel . . . employed in the business of commerce and navigation between places
in different states upon the lakes and navigable waters connecting said lakes, the trial of all issues
of fact shall be by jury if either party demands it.”).
148. 28 U.S.C. § 1333 (2018) (“The district courts shall have original jurisdiction, exclusive of
the courts of the States, of: (1) Any civil case of admiralty or maritime jurisdiction . . . .”).
149. See FED. R. CIV. P. 9 advisory committee’s note to 1966 amendment (“One of the important procedural consequences is that in the civil action either party may demand a jury trial,
while in the suit in admiralty there is no right to jury trial except as provided by statute.”).
150. See, e.g., Barry v. Shell Oil Co., No. 13-6133, 2014 WL 775662, at *3 (E.D. La. Feb. 25,
2014) (“[S]ince the removal of Plaintiff’s claim solely on the basis of admiralty jurisdiction would
deprive him of the right to pursue his nonmaritime remedy of a jury trial, the saving to suitors clause
under these circumstances prohibits the removal of this action.”); Riley v. Llog Expl. Co., No. 14437, 2014 WL 4345002, at *4 (E.D. La. Aug. 28, 2014) (“[T]here can be no question that a plaintiff
necessarily loses his right to a jury trial when a case is removed into admiralty.”).
151. See Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 9, 1 Stat. 73, 77 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 28 U.S.C.) (“And the trial of issues in fact, in the district courts, in all causes except
civil causes of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, shall be by jury.”); see also supra notes 117–
118 and accompanying text.
152. Fitzgerald v. U.S. Lines Co., 374 U.S. 16, 20 (1963) (footnotes omitted).
153. See Luera v. M/V Alberta, 635 F.3d 181, 196 (5th Cir. 2011) (“The practice of trying
admiralty claims to the bench is simply one of custom and tradition.”); see also Waring v. Clarke,
46 U.S. (5 How.) 441, 441 (1847) (“Nor is a trial by jury any test of admiralty jurisdiction.”).
154. See Sacks & Settergren, supra note 121, at 164–65 and accompanying text.
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recognize the possibility of providing jury trials under admiralty jurisdiction if such a right is granted by statute.155 For example, the Great
Lakes Statute affords the right to a jury trial under admiralty jurisdiction in cases meeting certain criteria.156 Prototypic admiralty procedure is therefore severable from admiralty jurisdiction within the federal judiciary. As a result, suitors could theoretically maintain their
right to a jury trial in federal court following removal based on admiralty jurisdiction if a statute provides for such a right.157 Fortunately,
there is a statute on point: the saving-to-suitors clause.
The saving-to-suitors clause is a statute that secures a maritime
plaintiff’s right to a jury trial,158 and there is no indication that this
protection is toothless in the federal judiciary.159 Consequently, the
saving-to-suitors clause can serve as a statute that provides a maritime
plaintiff with the right to a jury trial in federal court160 following lawful removal based on admiralty jurisdiction.161 While this function of

155. See FED. R. CIV. P. 9 advisory committee’s note to 1966 amendment (“One of the important procedural consequences is that in the civil action either party may demand a jury trial,
while in the suit in admiralty there is no right to jury trial except as provided by statute.”); see also
Fitzgerald, 374 U.S. at 17 (“[T]he actions for unseaworthiness and for maintenance and cure are
traditional admiralty remedies which in the absence of a statute do not ordinarily require trial by
jury.”).
156. See 28 U.S.C. § 1873 (2018) (“In any case of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction relating
to any matter of contract or tort arising upon or concerning any vessel of twenty tons or upward,
enrolled and licensed for the coasting trade, and employed in the business of commerce and navigation between places in different states upon the lakes and navigable waters connecting said lakes,
the trial of all issues of fact shall be by jury if either party demands it.”).
157. See FED. R. CIV. P. 9 advisory committee’s note to 1966 amendment (“One of the important procedural consequences is that in the civil action either party may demand a jury trial,
while in the suit in admiralty there is no right to jury trial except as provided by statute.”).
158. See Red Cross Line v. Atl. Fruit Co., 264 U.S. 109, 123–24 (1924) (“The ‘right of a common-law remedy’, [sic] so saved to suitors . . . include[s] all means other than proceedings in admiralty which may be employed to enforce the right or to redress the injury involved.”); Lewis v.
Lewis & Clark Marine, Inc., 531 U.S. 438, 454–55 (2001) (“Trial by jury is an obvious, but not
exclusive, example of the remedies available to suitors.”).
159. See The Moses Taylor, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 411, 431 (1866) (“It is not a remedy in the common-law courts which is saved, but a common-law remedy.”); see also Romero v. Int’l Terminal
Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354, 407 (1959) (Brennan, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part)
(“[T]he common-law remedies saved to suitors could properly be enforced in any tribunal otherwise having jurisdiction; the remedies saved were saved generally to suitors without discrimination
as to any tribunal.”).
160. See FED. R. CIV. P. 9 advisory committee’s note to 1966 amendment (“One of the important procedural consequences is that in the civil action either party may demand a jury trial,
while in the suit in admiralty there is no right to jury trial except as provided by statute.” (emphasis
added)).
161. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (2018) (“[A]ny civil action brought in a State court of which the
district courts of the United States have original jurisdiction, may be removed . . . .”); 28 U.S.C.
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the saving-to-suitors clause would not have been contemplated by the
drafters of the Judiciary Act of 1789, neither would a prohibition on
the removal of maritime cases, which is a function many courts have
endorsed.162 Thus, the reformed dominion proposed for the saving-tosuitors clause should not be defeated by occupying a role that was not
envisioned when the clause was originally drafted.163 This solution not
only maintains the plaintiff’s rights arising from the saving-to-suitors
clause but also does not flout the defendant’s lawful ability to remove
a case within the original jurisdiction of the federal courts.
B. Creating a New Era for Maritime Removal
Resistance to the free removability of maritime cases has arisen
from long-standing, routine practice on the issue.164 Averse to effecting sweeping changes, courts have concocted errant analyses to maintain the prohibition on maritime removal on the theory that history
should control.165 Yet, the judiciary is not a static entity.166 Congress

§ 1333 (2018) (“The district courts shall have original jurisdiction, exclusive of the courts of the
States, of: (1) Any civil case of admiralty or maritime jurisdiction . . . .”).
162. See, e.g., Pierce v. Parker Towing Co., 25 F. Supp. 3d 1372, 1383 (S.D. Ala. 2014)
(“§ 1333(1) remains an Act of Congress that limits the Court’s removal jurisdiction by ‘saving to
suitors’ common law remedies . . . .”); A.E.A. ex rel. Angelopoulos v. Volvo Penta of the Ams.,
LLC, 77 F. Supp. 3d 481, 491 (E.D. Va. 2015) (“[T]he saving to suitors clause, which establishes
concurrent jurisdiction over maritime cases, is an Act of Congress in which Congress has expressly
provided an exception to an otherwise removable action under § 1441.”); Barry v. Shell Oil Co.,
No. 13-6133, 2014 WL 775662, at *3 (E.D. La. Feb. 25, 2014) (“[S]ince the removal of Plaintiff’s
claim solely on the basis of admiralty jurisdiction would deprive him of the right to pursue his
nonmaritime remedy of a jury trial, the saving to suitors clause under these circumstances prohibits
the removal of this action.”).
163. See Berton v. Tietjen & Lang Dry Dock Co., 219 F. 763, 769 (D.N.J. 1915) (“‘Commonlaw remedy,’ [as used in the savings clause], is not to be restricted to such forms of remedy as were
known in the common-law courts when the Judiciary Act of 1789 was passed.”).
164. See, e.g., Riley v. Llog Expl. Co., No. 14-437, 2014 WL 4345002, at *4 (E.D. La. Aug. 28,
2014) (“Defendants have cited no case where a federal court presented only with claims arising
under the general maritime law has granted the parties a jury trial. Indeed, to do so would require
the court to disregard hundreds of years of admiralty tradition, something this Court is not prepared
to do.”).
165. See, e.g., Coronel v. AK Victory, 1 F. Supp. 3d 1175, 1178 (W.D. Wash. 2014) (“Both
parties’ arguments for or against the removal of Plaintiff’s general maritime law claims focus on
the language of the removal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1441. The court concludes, however, that it is the
statutory grant of admiralty jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1333, and more than 200 years of precedent
interpreting this grant, that ultimately determine the removability of Plaintiff’s claims.”).
166. The Structure of the Federal Courts, FED. JUD. CTR., https://www.fjc.gov/history/timeline/structure-federal-courts [https://perma.cc/C4K4-3J6V] (“Since the establishment of the federal
courts in 1789, Congress has periodically reshaped the judiciary through legislation. Such changes
have included the creation and abolition of courts, the authorization of new judicial positions, and
the reorganization of the judicial circuits.”).
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has, and does, alter the character of the federal courts167—the evolution of the removal statute is a prime example.168 The removal statute
currently enables removal based on the district courts’ original jurisdiction,169 which should be interpreted by its plain meaning.170 Deviations from the statutory standards and exceptions for removal would
be inappropriate in the absence of an established and compelling judicial doctrine to the contrary. Given the historical wavering by courts
on the issue, the judicially imposed prohibition on maritime removal
is not one of them.
Removed maritime cases are not the only example of the federal
courts declining to exercise statutorily authorized jurisdiction, yet they
are perhaps the least defensible. Federal courts also refuse to adjudicate domestic relations matters under diversity jurisdiction171 and various judicial abstention doctrines require courts to forgo exercising legitimate grants of jurisdiction.172 However, these instances of
jurisdictional restraint have rationales founded in state sovereignty
that, in essence, can only be addressed by yielding to state court resolution.173 Barring removal of maritime cases is not founded in state
sovereignty but rather the straightforward concern of depriving plaintiffs of jury trials under admiralty jurisdiction174—curable by
167. See id.
168. See Hrdlick, supra note 10, at 536 (“The right [to removal] is ‘malleable’ in the sense that
the right is not fundamental, and thus has been and should be changed over time to suit prevailing
views of both our State and Federal Judiciaries.”).
169. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (2018) (“[A]ny civil action brought in a State court of which the
district courts of the United States have original jurisdiction, may be removed . . . .”).
170. Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Union Planters Bank, N.A., 530 U.S. 1, 6 (2000)
(“[W]hen ‘the statute’s language is plain, “the sole function of the courts’”—at least where the
disposition required by the text is not absurd—‘is to enforce it according to its terms.’” (quoting
United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 241 (1989)).
171. Anthony B. Ullman, Note, The Domestic Relations Exception to Diversity Jurisdiction, 83
COLUM. L. REV. 1824, 1824 (1983).
172. See Rebecca E. Swenson, Application of the Federal Abstention Doctrines to the Domestic
Relations Exception to Federal Diversity Jurisdiction, 1983 DUKE L.J. 1095, 1105–06.
173. See Mathew D. Staver, The Abstention Doctrines: Balancing Comity with Federal Court
Intervention, 28 SETON HALL L. REV. 1102, 1102 (1998) (“The Abstention Doctrines required federal courts to step aside in order to allow the state adjudicatory process to take its course. The
purpose of these doctrines is to preserve the balance between state and federal sovereignty.”);
Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689, 714 (1992) (“The whole subject of the domestic relations
of husband and wife, parent and child, belongs to the laws of the States and not to the laws of the
United States.” (quoting In re Burrus, 136 U.S. 586, 593–94 (1890))).
174. See FED. R. CIV. P. 9 advisory committee’s note to 1966 amendment (“[I]n the suit in
admiralty there is no right to jury trial except as provided by statute.”); see, e.g., Barry v. Shell Oil
Co., No. 13-6133, 2014 WL 775662, at *3 (E.D. La. Feb. 25, 2014) (“[T]he removal of Plaintiff’s
claim solely on the basis of admiralty jurisdiction would deprive him of the right to pursue his
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affording maritime plaintiffs jury trials following removal. Further,
while the domestic relations exception and abstention doctrines have
been clearly accepted and established by the judiciary,175 the most recent higher court decisions evaluating maritime removal have reinforced the uncertainty as to whether exercising jurisdiction in these
cases is in fact improper.176
Despite instances of judicial preference for caselaw over jurisdiction granting statutes,177 on the issue of removal, the Supreme Court
has advocated for adherence to the plain words of the removal statute
and its corresponding exceptions.178 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) states that
exceptions to removal based on original jurisdiction must be expressly
provided by an act of Congress.179 The Supreme Court has stated that
“[t]he need to take the express exception requirement seriously is underscored by examples of indisputable prohibitions of removal in a
number of other statutes, e.g., § 1445, which demonstrate that, when
Congress wishes to give plaintiffs an absolute choice of forum, it is
capable of doing so in unmistakable terms.”180 The saving-to-suitors
clause does not fill the role of an express exception to removal. Not
only does it lack an overt prohibition,181 but it was drafted more than
a century before maritime cases would be statutorily cognizable within
removal jurisdiction.182
nonmaritime remedy of a jury trial . . . .”); Riley v. Llog Expl. Co., No. 14-437, 2014 WL 4345002,
at *4 (E.D. La. Aug. 28, 2014) (“[T]here can be no question that a plaintiff loses his right to a jury
trial when a case is removed into admiralty.”).
175. See Swenson, supra note 172, at 1096–106.
176. See Lu Junhong v. Boeing Co., 792 F.3d 805, 818 (7th Cir. 2015); Sangha v. Navig8 Shipmanagement Priv. Ltd., 882 F.3d 96, 100 (5th Cir. 2018).
177. See Swenson, supra note 172, at 1095; Leonard Birdsong, Comity and Our Federalism in
the Twenty-First Century: The Abstention Doctrines Will Always Be with Us—Get Over It!!, 36
CREIGHTON L. REV. 375, 375–76 (2003).
178. See Breuer v. Jim’s Concrete of Brevard, Inc., 538 U.S. 691, 694–95 (2003).
179. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (2018) (“Except as otherwise expressly provided by Act of Congress,
any civil action brought in a State court of which the district courts of the United States have original jurisdiction, may be removed by the defendant or the defendants . . . .” (emphasis added)).
180. Breuer, 538 U.S. at 692.
181. See 28 U.S.C. § 1333 (2018) (“The district courts shall have original jurisdiction, exclusive of the courts of the States, of: (1) Any civil case of admiralty or maritime jurisdiction, saving
to suitors in all cases all other remedies to which they are otherwise entitled.”).
182. The saving-to-suitors clause was drafted in 1789. See Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 9, 1
Stat. 73, 76–77 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.) (“[S]aving to suitors, in all
cases, the right of a common law remedy, where the common law is competent to give it . . . .”).
Maritime claims did not enter the purview of the removal statute until 1911. See Judicial Code of
1911, Pub. L. No. 61-475, § 28, 36 Stat. 1087, 1094–95 (“Any other suit of a civil nature, at law or
in equity, of which the district courts of the United States are given jurisdiction by this title . . . may
be removed into the district court of the United States . . . .”).
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The absence of maritime claims from the removal exemptions of
28 U.S.C. § 1445 does not appear to be in error. Congress has had
ample time to add maritime suits to the exemptions since original jurisdiction became the definitive removal standard in 1948,183 and a
federal court first allowed removal of a maritime case on the basis of
admiralty jurisdiction in 1956.184 Moreover, the series of at least a
dozen federal court decisions that allowed removal of maritime
claims, beginning with Ryan in 2013,185 did not prompt Congress to
expressly prohibit this practice. Because the removal statute, as
drafted by Congress, already encompasses maritime claims,186 a delayed legislative proclamation would almost certainly be a prohibition
on removal rather than an ancillary allowance. At this point in time, it
seems unlikely that Congress will settle the uncertainty. A conclusive
answer is far more likely to arise from the judicial branch.

183. See Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 646, § 1441(a), 62 Stat. 869, 937–38 (codified at 28 U.S.C.
§ 1441(a)) (“Except as otherwise expressly provided by Act of Congress, any civil action brought
in a State court of which the district courts of the United States have original jurisdiction may be
removed by the defendant . . . .”).
184. See Davis v. Matson Navigation Co., 143 F. Supp. 537, 538–39 (N.D. Cal. 1956) (permitting removal of a maritime case).
185. See Ryan v. Hercules Offshore, Inc., 945 F. Supp. 2d 722, 779 (S.D. Tex. 2013); Wells v.
Abe’s Boat Rentals Inc., No. H-13-1112, 2013 WL 3110322, at *4 (S.D. Tex. June 18, 2013); Carrigan v. M/V AMC Ambassador, No. H-13-03208, 2014 WL 358353, at *2 (S.D. Tex. Jan. 31,
2014); Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Starr Indem. & Liab. Co., No. H-14-1147, 2014 WL 2739309, at *2
(S.D. Tex. June 17, 2014), rev’d on other grounds, 2014 WL 4167807 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 20, 2014);
Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Starr Indem. & Liab. Ins. Co., 181 F. Supp. 3d 347, 361 (S.D. Tex. 2015);
Murphy v. Seadrill Ams., Inc., No. H-4-1454, 2014 WL 12642104, at *4 (S.D. Tex. Nov. 14, 2014);
Costanza v. Accutrans, Inc., No. 17-5706, 2017 WL 4785004, at *5 (E.D. La. Oct. 24, 2017);
Bridges v. Phillips 66 Co., No. 13-477, 2013 WL 6092803, at *5 (M.D. La. Nov. 19, 2013); Harrold
v. Liberty Ins. Underwriters, Inc., No. 13-762, 2014 WL 688984, at *4 (M.D. La. Feb. 20, 2014);
Garza v. Phillips 66 Co., No. 13-742, 2014 WL 1330547, at *5 (M.D. La. Apr. 1, 2014); Provost
v. Offshore Serv. Vessels, LLC, No. 14-89, 2014 WL 2515412, at *3 (M.D. La. June 4, 2014);
Walker v. BP Prods. N. Am., Inc., No. 1-13-CV-257, 2013 WL 11332950, at *4 (E.D. Tex.
Sept. 16, 2013).
186. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (2018) (“Except as otherwise expressly provided by Act of Congress, any civil action brought in a State court of which the district courts of the United States have
original jurisdiction, may be removed by the defendant . . . .”); id. § 1333 (“The district courts shall
have original jurisdiction, exclusive of the courts of the States, of: (1) Any civil case of admiralty
or maritime jurisdiction, saving to suitors in all cases all other remedies to which they are otherwise
entitled.”).
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No higher court has given a complete answer to the issue,187 but
the uncertainty promulgated by the Fifth and Seventh Circuits188 is a
strong indication that the matter is not as definitive as many district
courts have contended.189 In 2015, the Seventh Circuit in Lu Junhong
v. Boeing Co.190 ruled that admiralty jurisdiction could serve as a basis
for removal of maritime claims following the JVCA.191 While the
court did not consider whether the saving-to-suitors clause could serve
as an impediment to removal, because the plaintiff did not make such
an argument, the court did not find the removal of a maritime case to
be so egregious as to address the issue sua sponte.192 The Fifth Circuit
similarly lacked strong convictions about the role of the saving-tosuitors clause in the maritime removal debate.193 In 2018, the Fifth
Circuit in Sangha v. Navig8 Shipmanagement Private Ltd.194 stated
that it was not clear if the saving-to-suitors clause prohibits removal
of maritime claims following the JVCA.195 Thus, the few higher courts
that have considered this particular issue after the JVCA196 have aided
the minority position by casting doubt on the conclusion that the saving-to-suitors clause is a conclusive bar to removing maritime cases.197
187. The Supreme Court’s dicta in Romero v. International Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S.
354, 371–72 (1959), merely discouraged removal of maritime cases under federal question jurisdiction. This was a known impossibility since the creation of federal question jurisdiction. See
Watson & Xanthopoulou, supra note 46, at 1139.
188. See Lu Junhong v. Boeing Co., 792 F.3d 805, 818 (7th Cir. 2015); Sangha v. Navig8 Shipmanagement Priv. Ltd., 882 F.3d 96, 100 (5th Cir. 2018).
189. See cases cited supra note 17.
190. 792 F.3d 805 (7th Cir. 2015).
191. Id. at 818.
192. See id.
193. Sangha, 882 F.3d at 100.
194. 882 F.3d 96 (5th Cir. 2018).
195. Id. at 100 (“[T]he question of subject-matter jurisdiction presented in this case—whether
the saving-to-suitors clause of the federal maritime statute prohibits removal of general maritime
claims absent an independent basis for federal jurisdiction in light of Congress’s December 2011
amendment to the federal removal statute—is not clear.”).
196. The 11th Circuit, in a case unrelated to removal, recently stated in dicta that maritime cases
cannot be removed on the basis of admiralty jurisdiction. DeRoy v. Carnival Corp., 963 F.3d 1302,
1314–15 (11th Cir. 2020). However, the court expressly acknowledged that the basis for this prohibition is a precedent that predates the JVCA and that the court has not considered whether such
a holding survives the JVCA. Id. at 1314 n.16 (referencing Armstrong v. Ala. Power Co., 667 F.2d
1385 (11th Cir. 1982)).
197. See Lu Junhong, 792 F.3d at 818 (“Our conclusion that § 1333(1) supplies admiralty jurisdiction shows that subject-matter jurisdiction exists. Plaintiffs thus could have filed these suits
directly in federal court (as many victims of the crash did). If the saving-to-suitors clause allows
them to stay in state court even after the 2011 amendment, they are free to waive or forfeit that
right—which given the scope of § 1331(1) concerns venue rather than subject matter jurisdiction.
Boeing therefore was entitled to remove these suits to federal court.”); Sangha, 882 F.3d at 100
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Based on the original intent of the saving-to-suitors clause198 and the
need for express exceptions to removal,199 uncertainty from the higher
courts is warranted. It is also worth noting that the Supreme Court recently described the procedural history of a case before it in part by
merely stating that the defendants removed the case to federal court
by “invoking federal maritime jurisdiction” under 28 U.S.C. § 1333—
a practice categorically barred under the predominant view on maritime removal.200 The preceding lower court decisions from the case
unsurprisingly reveal the existence of an independent basis for federal
jurisdiction, which the Supreme Court failed to mention,201 so removal
was never at issue in the case. However, the Supreme Court’s seemingly routine description of removal based on admiralty jurisdiction
could be an indication that highest court does not consider this manner
of removal to implicate a plainly sacrosanct prohibition within the federal judiciary.

(“[T]he question of subject-matter jurisdiction presented in this case—whether the saving-to-suitors clause of the federal maritime statute prohibits removal of general maritime claims absent an
independent basis for federal jurisdiction in light of Congress’s December 2011 amendment to the
federal removal statute—is not clear.”).
198. The saving-to-suitors clause has emphatically and repeatedly been deemed a method to
protect common law remedies and not the state forum. See The Moses Taylor, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.)
411, 431 (1866) (“It is not a remedy in the common-law courts which is saved, but a common-law
remedy”); The Belfast, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 624, 644 (1868) (Common law remedies are saved “to
suitors, and not to the State courts.”); Poirrier v. Nicklos Drilling Co., 648 F.2d 1063, 1066 (5th
Cir. 1981) (“The ‘saving to suitors’ clause does no more than preserve the right of maritime suitors
to pursue nonmaritime remedies. It does not guarantee them a nonfederal forum, or limit the right
of defendants to remove such actions to federal court where there exists some basis for federal
jurisdiction other than admiralty.” (emphasis omitted)); Romero v. Int’l Terminal Operating Co.,
358 U.S. 354, 407 (1959) (Brennan, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part) (“[T]he commonlaw remedies saved to suitors could properly be enforced in any tribunal otherwise having jurisdiction; the remedies saved were saved generally to suitors without discrimination as to any tribunal.”);
Red Cross Line v. Atl. Fruit Co., 264 U.S. 109, 123–24 (1924) (“The ‘right of a common law
remedy’, [sic] so saved to suitors . . . include[s] all means other than proceedings in admiralty
which may be employed to enforce the right or to redress the injury involved.”); Lewis v. Lewis &
Clark Marine, Inc., 531 U.S. 438, 445 (2001) (“Thus, the saving to suitors clause preserves remedies and the concurrent jurisdiction of state courts over some admiralty and maritime claims.”).
199. See Breuer v. Jim’s Concrete of Brevard, Inc., 538 U.S. 691, 694–95 (2003).
200. See Air & Liquid Sys. Corp. v. DeVries, 139 S. Ct. 986, 992 (2019) (“Invoking federal
maritime jurisdiction, the manufacturers removed the cases to federal court.”).
201. See DeVries v. Gen. Elec. Co., 188 F. Supp. 3d 454, 454 (E.D. Pa. 2016) (“This case was
removed in January of 2013 from the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia to the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania . . . . The basis of jurisdiction is federal question jurisdiction (pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1442).”); In re Asbestos Prods. Liab. Litig. (No. VI), 873
F.3d 232, 235 (3d Cir. 2017) (“The District Court had federal-officer jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1442(a)(1), and maritime jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1333(1).”).
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An ultimate judicial resolution of this issue will undoubtedly turn
on how the modern judiciary’s current removal regime will integrate
and contextualize both the centuries-old saving-to-suitors clause and
canonical admiralty jurisdiction. Both facets of the early federal court
system served intelligible purposes for their contemporaneous judicial
period as previously described,202 yet the federal judiciary has evolved
significantly since that time.203 Ensuring that the saving-to-suitors
clause and prototypic admiralty jurisdiction are not anachronistically
applied in the modern federal judiciary requires flexibility within the
confines of the framers’ original intent.
V. CONCLUSION
Removal of maritime cases is shrouded in a long-standing, dogmatic prohibition which courts have fought hard to maintain.204 Despite the central, albeit errant,205 role the removal statute’s FDR has
played in denying removal of maritime claims, 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b) is
no longer a colorable impediment following the JVCA.206 In its absence, erroneous analyses and blatant disregard for the revised removal statute have maintained the prohibition.207 The FDR has now
been supplanted by the saving-to-suitors clause as the primary
202. See Goldman & Goldman, supra note 124 and accompanying text; Lewis, 531 U.S. at 445
(“Thus, the saving to suitors clause preserves remedies and the concurrent jurisdiction of state
courts over some admiralty and maritime claims.”).
203. See The Structure of the Federal Courts, supra note 166.
204. See, e.g., Romero, 358 U.S. at 372 (“By making maritime cases removable to the federal
courts it would make considerable inroads into the traditionally exercised concurrent jurisdiction
of the state courts in admiralty matters—a jurisdiction which it was the unquestioned aim of the
savings clause of 1789 to preserve.”).
205. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
206. The claw back provision of 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b) (FDR) became applicable to only 28
U.S.C. § 1332 (diversity jurisdiction) following the 2011 amendments to the statute: “A civil action
otherwise removable solely on the basis of the jurisdiction under section 1332(a) of this title may
not be removed if any of the parties in interest properly joined and served as defendants is a citizen
of the State in which such action is brought.” The Federal Courts Jurisdiction and Venue Clarification Act of 2011, Pub. L. 112-63, § 103, 125 Stat. 758, 759.
207. See, e.g., Leloff v. Georgia-Pacific Consumer Prods., Ltd., No. 16-cv-00539, 2016 WL
3457166, at *2 (D. Or. June 23, 2016) (“The ‘saving to suitors’ clause preserves the plaintiff’s
choice of forum . . . .”); Smith v. Marquette Transp. Co., No. 16-CV-01545, 2017 WL 3648459, at
*3 (W.D. La. Aug. 1, 2017) (“[A]bsent another jurisdictional basis, this Court lacks subject matter
jurisdiction over general maritime claims removed from state court.”); Coronel v. AK Victory, 1 F.
Supp. 3d 1175, 1178 (W.D. Wash. 2014) (“Both parties’ arguments for or against the removal of
Plaintiff’s general maritime law claims focus on the language of the removal statute, 28 U.S.C.
§ 1441. The court concludes, however, that it is the statutory grant of admiralty jurisdiction, 28
U.S.C. § 1333, and more than 200 years of precedent interpreting this grant, that ultimately determine the removability of Plaintiff’s claims.”).
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rationale for excluding maritime claims from removal jurisdiction.208
Yet, the saving-to-suitors clause is neither an express nor a functional
bar on removal because jury trials can be provided under admiralty
jurisdiction pursuant to the saving-to-suitors clause itself.209 This avenue upholds the intent of the saving-to-suitors clause,210 does not
spurn the plain language of the removal statute,211 and honors the Supreme Court’s declaration that exceptions to removal jurisdiction must
be express.212 Still, this strategy requires the arduous task of discarding
antiquated notions about admiralty jurisdiction213 and adapting the
original purpose of the saving-to-suitors clause214 within the context
of the modern judiciary.215 In this framework, it should be clear that
maritime claims are removable pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441 provided
that remedies such as jury trials are thereafter afforded to suitors in

208. See, e.g., A.E.A. ex rel. Angelopoulos v. Volvo Penta of the Ams., LLC, 77 F. Supp. 3d
481, 491 (E.D. Va. 2015) (“[T]he saving to suitors clause, which establishes concurrent jurisdiction
over maritime cases, is an Act of Congress in which Congress has expressly provided an exception
to an otherwise removable action under § 1441.”); Barry v. Shell Oil Co., No. 13-6133, 2014 WL
775662, at *3 (E.D. La. Feb. 25, 2014) (“[S]ince the removal of Plaintiff’s claim solely on the basis
of admiralty jurisdiction would deprive him of the right to pursue his nonmaritime remedy of a jury
trial, the saving to suitors clause under these circumstances prohibits the removal of this action.”).
209. See FED. R. CIV. P. 9 advisory committee’s note to 1966 amendment (“One of the important procedural consequences is that in the civil action either party may demand a jury trial,
while in the suit in admiralty there is no right to jury trial except as provided by statute.”); Red
Cross Line v. Atl. Fruit Co., 264 U.S. 109, 123–24 (1924) (“The ‘right of a common-law remedy’,
[sic] so saved to suitors . . . include[s] all means other than proceedings in admiralty which may be
employed to enforce the right or to redress the injury involved.”); see also Lewis v. Lewis & Clark
Marine, Inc., 531 U.S. 438, 454–55 (2001) (“Trial by jury is an obvious, but not exclusive, example
of the remedies available to suitors.”).
210. See The Moses Taylor, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 411, 431 (1866) (“It is not a remedy in the common-law courts which is saved, but a common-law remedy.”); The Belfast, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 624,
644 (1868) (Common law remedies are saved “to suitors, and not to the State courts.”).
211. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (2018) (“[A]ny civil action brought in a State court of which the
district courts of the United States have original jurisdiction, may be removed . . . .”).
212. See Breuer v. Jim’s Concrete of Brevard, Inc., 538 U.S. 691, 692, 696 (2003) (“The need
to take the express exception requirement seriously is underscored by examples of indisputable
prohibitions of removal in a number of other statutes, e.g., § 1445, which demonstrates that, when
Congress wishes to give plaintiffs an absolute choice of forum, it is capable of doing so in unmistakable terms.”).
213. See, e.g., Barry, 2014 WL 775662, at *3 (“[T]he removal of Plaintiff’s claim solely on the
basis of admiralty jurisdiction would deprive him of the right to pursue his nonmaritime remedy of
a jury trial . . . .” ); Riley v. Llog Expl. Co., No. 14-437, 2014 WL 4345002, at *4 (E.D. La. Aug. 28,
2014) (“[T]here can be no question that a plaintiff loses his right to a jury trial when a case is
removed into admiralty.”).
214. See The Moses Taylor, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at 431 (“It is not a remedy in the common-law
courts which is saved, but a common-law remedy.”); The Belfast, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) at 644 (Common law remedies are saved “to suitors, and not to the State courts.”).
215. See supra note 140 and accompanying text.
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federal court.216 Alas, our modern judiciary is not fettered by the outmoded constraints that may have plagued the colonial courts,217 and
its versatility should be utilized for progress and consistency. Where
the framers envisioned a consistent judiciary, especially with regard
to admiralty matters,218 it seems wildly inconsistent to consider maritime cases an obscure exception to the original jurisdiction standard
for removal.219 The time has come to relinquish the long-standing
dogma that has prevented a plain reading of the removal statute and
assimilate the saving-to-suitors clause within the modern judiciary according to its original purpose—to save the remedy, and not the forum.220

216. See Lewis v. Lewis & Clark Marine, Inc., 531 U.S. 438, 454–55 (2001) (“Trial by jury is
an obvious, but not exclusive, example of the remedies available to suitors.”).
217. See Force, supra note 27.
218. See Goldman & Goldman, supra note 124.
219. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (2018) (“[A]ny civil action brought in a State court of which the
district courts of the United States have original jurisdiction, may be removed . . . .”).
220. See The Moses Taylor, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 411, 431 (1866) (“It is not a remedy in the common-law courts which is saved, but a common-law remedy.”); The Belfast, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 624,
644 (1869) (Common law remedies are saved “to suitors, and not to the State courts.”).
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